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ARTICLES
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT: THE TWO
NEW TESTS FOR SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT IN B.(P.A.) v.
CURRY AND T.(G.) v. GRIFFITHS
SHEILA WILDEMANt

Recently, Canadian courts have been divided on the issue of whether or in
what conditions vicarious liability may be assigned for an employee's act of
sexual assault. In particular, the controversy has focused upon the issue of the
proper test for gauging whether a sexual assault may be deemed to have been
committed within the scope of employment. The most radical new approach
to scope of employment in the context of sexual assault has been that of the
B. C. Court of Appeal in the case B.(P.A.) v. Curry and its companion
judgment T.(G.) v. Griffiths. In B.(P.A.), the B.C. Court of Appeal
rejected the traditional Salmond test for scope of employment as unhelpful in
cases involving sexual assault, and proposed in its stead two new tests: one,
offered by Huddart ]A., based in an analysis of the conferral of authority;
and another, offered by Newbury ]A., based in a flexible analysis of
proximity between the tort and employment duties. Both B.(P.A.) and
Griffiths have recently been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada. This paper seeks, first, to situate the issue of vicarious liability for
sexual assault against the backg-f'ound of the differing justificatory bases for
vicarious liability generally. Next, it looks more specifically to the different
tests which have been applied in determining the scope of employment issue,
focusing on intentional torts including those implicated in the act of sexual
assault. Ultimately, it offers a slight variation on the two tests for scope of
employment of Huddart and Newbury ]]A., incorporating elements of each.
The paper concludes by pointing out the perceived injustices of assigning
vicarious liability for sexual assault, and counters these by affirming as most
appropriate in this context the principle of commutative justice on which
Madame justice Huddart's analysis may be regarded as based.
Tout recemment, les tribunaux canadiens ont demontre une divergence
d'opinion sur la question de l'applicabilitr! de la responsabilite de l'employeur
aux cas d'agressions sexuelles commises par un employi. La controverse s'est
t BA (University of Toronto), M.A. (Columbia), LLB. anticipated 1999
(University of Toronto), Dalhousie Law School 1997-98 by letter of permission.
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particulierement developpee quant au test applicable afin de determiner si
l'agression sexuelle est survenue ou non dans le cadre de l'emploi. La Cour
d'appel de la Colombie-Britannique a recemment instaure une approche des
plus radicales sur le sujet, dans !es decisions B. (P.A.) v. Curry et T.(G.) v.
Griffiths. Dans la premiere decision, la Cour d'appel rejette l'approche
traditionnelle de Salmond relative a la qualification du cadre de l'emploi,
prt!textant son inefficacitt quant aux cas d 'agressions sexuelles et sou met
plutot deux nouveaux tests: le premier, mis en place par la juge Huddart,
analyse le degrt d 'autorite confiee a l'employe a/ors que la seconde approche,
suggerte par la juge Newbury, propose une analyse flexible de la proximite
entre l'acte dommageable et les fonctions attributes al'employe dans le cadre
de son travail La Cour supreme a tout recemment accorde un droit d'appel
pour chacune de ces deux causes. Dans cet ouvrage, l'auteure tente dans un
premier temps de positionner dans le tableau divergent traditionnel le
probleme de la responsabilite de l'employeur a l'tgard des cas d'agressions
sexuelles perpltrtes par ses employes. Dans un deuxieme temps, l'auteure
analyse plus prtcisement les differents tests mis sur pied afin de determiner la
question du cadre de l'emploi, s'attardant aux actes dommageables
intentionnels, incluant ceux pertinents aux cas d 'agressions sexuelles. En
dernier lieu, l 'auteure offre une ltgere variation des deux approches relatives
au cadre de l'emploi soumises par les juges Huddart et Newbury, incorporant
des elements propres a chacune des approches. L 'auteure conclut en
souli!faant !es injustices creees dans !'application de la responsabilite de
l'employeur aux cas d'agressions sexuelles et soumet que !'analyse proposee par
madame la juge Huddart dans sa decision, baste sur le principe de justice
commutative, s'avere plus appropriee afin de contrer ces injustices.

I. INTRODUCTION: VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR
SEXUAL ASSAULT

The past decade in Canadian tort law has been marked by an
unprecedented increase in battery actions based in allegations of
incest and sexual assault. 1 While such actions, brought either in lieu
1

Civil actions for sexual assault are most commonly brought under the tort
heading of battery, though this has been supplemented of late with breach of
fiduciary duty. The coexistence of claims in battery and breach of fiducary duty was
explicitly recognized with regard to incest cases by the Supreme Court in M(K.) v.
M(H) [1992) 3 S.C.R. 6. Actions against parties other than the perpetrator have
been brought in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and/or, what will be the
subject of this paper, vicarious liability.
Bruce Feldthusen, in "The Canadian Experiment With the Civil Action for
Sexual Battery" in N. Mullany, ed., Torts in the Nineties, (Sydney: LBC
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of or in addition to criminal proceedings, may on the one hand be
prohibitively costly, they offer claimants some potential for a more
direct form of justice than criminal proceedings alone. That is, in a
civil action, the sexual battery claimant has an increased chance of
participation in and control over proceedings. And further, he or
she has a chance to receive some amount of compensation, in the
form of a monetary award (potentially greater than any criminal
victim compensation), and/or a measure of public accountability on
the part of the assailant and other responsible parties. 2
The increase in actions for sexual battery has led to the
development of a body of case law which has had a significant
impact on some fundamental areas of Canadian tort law.
Landmark cases such as Norberg v. Wynrib, 3 M (K) v. M. (H.), 4 and
others have been a source of change and controversy on issues of
consent, breach of fiduciary duty, the assigning of punitive
damages, the rules of discovery and the law of evidence.5
Many of the recent developments in this body of law have
focused upon extension of liability beyond the particular assailant
to third parties. This pressing of the limits of legal responsibility
Information Services, 1997), writes: "Prior to 1985 there had been [in Canada] only
a handful of civil actions pertaining to sexual abuse. Since then, more than 50
Canadian sexual battery and related judgments have been reported" (274). Many,
though not all the claims in this time have been brought by adult survivors of incest
and other child sexual abuse (275). While Feldthusen notes that many plaintiffs have
been successful so far, he qualifies this with the fact that a large number of cases have
followed criminal convictions and of these, fewer than half were defended in the
subsequent suit. He suggests that "[t]he legal landscape will change significantly as
more defended actions come to trial" at 277.
2 As Feldthusen (supra note 1) suggests, damages in a civil suit, assuming a solvent
defendent, will likely exceed a successful criminal injury compensation claim (for
which maximum awards vary widely between provinces). Success in the latter does
not preclude seeking the former. Still, the 'ungenerous conventional' damage
award in a civil sexual battery action was, until recently, about $50,000, with a de
facto cap of $100,000 plus $50,000 aggravated damages. This is less than the
Canadian common law inflation-adjusted cap for basic personal injury claims
(299). Yet there is some indication of an upward trend in sexual battery damages
(see Feldthusen at 299 footnote 124 on the B.C.C.A. case DAA v. DKB). A thorough
review of damage awards in civil sexual assault cases is found in SY v. FGC [1996]
B.C.J. No 1596 (QL.), and see Feldthusen at 298-301.
3 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226.
4 [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6.
5 Feldthusen, supra note 1 at 275.
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attaching to incidents of sexual assault is of particular practical
concern where the perpetrator is insolvent or dead. Thus both more
traditional actions in negligence and more innovative actions for
breach of fiduciary duty have been brought against nonperpetrating parties claimed to have breached a duty to protect the
plaintiff. Generally, these are such parties as have had supervisory
control over the perpetrator, or have had a professionally-based
duty to protect the claimant; in cases of sexual assault of minors,
the relevant third party may be a non-perpetrating parent or other
guardian.6
What had until recently seemed a much more tenuous means of
extending liability to third parties in civil actions for sexual assault
is the common law doctrine of vicarious liability, or respondeat
superior ("let the superior answer"). This is the long-established
doctrine by which a "master" (or employer) is liable for torts
committed by his or her "servant" (or employee), provided the
wrong in question was committed in the course or scope of
employment.7 Vicarious liability is not a form of strict (or no-fault)

6

The parent-child relationship was unequivocally accepted as a fiduciary
relationship in M(K) v. M(H), supra note 1.
Cases bringing actions in negligence against third parries, such as doctors,
teachers, peace officers, or social workers include M(M.) v. K(K) (1989), 38 BCLR
(2d) 273; Doe v. Awasis Agency of Northern Manitoba (1990), 72 DLR (4th) 738;
Lythv. Dagg-(1988), 46 C.C.L.T. 25; and Doe v. Metropolitan Police (1991), 1 OR
(3d) 416. See Feldrhusen, supra note 1 at 288 footnote 67.
Cases brought against mothers for failing ro protect victims from abusive fathers
and stepfathers include LAJ v. HJ (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 306; and see A.D. Y. v.
M Y.Y. [1994] B.C.J. No. 375 (Q.L.); and Wilkieson-Valiente v. Wilkieson [1994]
O.J. No. 148 (QL.). See generally E. Grace & S. Vella, "Vesting Mothers with
Power They Do Not Have: The Non-Offending Parent in Civil Sexual Assault
Cases" (1994) 7 C.J.W.L. 184.
7 Lord Reid writes in Stavely Iron & Chemical Co. v. Jones Ltd [1956] App. Cas.
627 (H.L.) at 643: "an employer, though guilty of no fault himself, is liable for the
damage done by the fault or negligence of his servant acting in the course of his
employment." Vicarious liability doctrine has at rimes been linked with the
negligence-based notion of breaching a duty to rake care in selecting or supervising
the wrongdoer (L. D. Rainaldi, Remedies in Tort, (Toronto: Carswell) vol. 4,
(1986) at 36). Yet modern writers generally assert that vicarious liability is most
properly regarded as a form of strict liability, not dependent upon any real or
presumed fault of the master (see P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2nd ed.,
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 86; J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 8th ed. (Sydney:
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liability as that concept is generally understood, as it requires that
tortious fault be established on the part of the employee.
Nonetheless, it is often regarded as such, since the employer's
liability is determined in absence of his or her direct fault and
without reference to the issue of reasonable care. 8 In particular,
vicarious liability must be distinguished from direct employer
negligence, typically a matter of faulty practices in hiring, training,
or supervising employees. The question raised under the heading of
vicarious liability, rather, is whether an employer who is not (or not
necessarily) found to be negligent or otherwise at fault with regard
to an employee's act of sexual assault may yet be vicariously liable
for that assault. Such a finding may potentially be made even in
contexts where physical intimacy with clients or others is expressly
prohibited and guarded against.
In brief, the doctrine of vicarious liability requires the meeting
of three criteria: I) that there be a tort, 2) that the tortfeasor qualify
as the defendant's employee, and 3) that the tort be committed in
the course or scope of employment. Of these, the key concern in
claims of vicarious liability for sexual assault is not the
determination of the underlying act as a tort, nor the sometimes
contested issue of identification of an employer-employee
relationship. 9 Rather, the main concern-and that at issue in the
Law Book Company, 1992) 366; P. S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of
Torts (London: Butterworths, 1967) 3).
As will be discussed below, the main policy justification for this form of strict
liability, and that which has been invoked in certain recent Canadian cases which
have found employer liability for an employee's sexual assaults, is "the notion that
the master should bear the risks that are generated by the conduct of the master's
business" (P. Hogg, ibid. 86-7. See also, Atiyah ibid. at ch.2 and Fleming ibid. at
ch.2.
8 See W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul,
Minn.: West, 1984).
9 This issue has traditionally been set as whether the tortfeasor is an employee,
and as such, one for whose torts the employer may be vicariously liable, or an
independent contractor, in which case there is generally no vicarious liability
Fleming, supra note 7 at 416). This has generally been determined with reference to
the 'control test', whereby "an individual will be considered to have been hired as an
employee, for the purposes of the doctrine of vicarious liability, when the employer
not only tells that person what to do, but how to do it as well" (ibid.).
Yet the criteria for determining those relationships which may give rise to
vicarious liability have been called into question in a number of jurisdictions,
particularly in the context of hospital liability. Weinrib in The Idea of Private Law

a.c.
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cases to be examined in this paper-is whether a close enough
connection may be established between the employee's tortious
sexual assault and the employee's legitimate role such that the
assault may be deemed to fall within the scope of employment. It
has been suggested that no consistent underlying principle
determines scope of employment-that the test varies according to
the facts in each case, as the employer's liability must be assessed in
light of the particular tortious act's relationship to the particular
employment role. According to Fleming, this means that
"precedents are helpful only when they present a suggestive
uniformity on parallel facts." 10 Further, it has been suggested that
scope of employment findings may reflect policy concerns rather
than any formal principle: attempts at a "judicial compromise
between the 'social necessity' of making a master answerable for
injury occasioned by servants entrusted with the power of acting in
his business and the conviction that it would be unjust, and indeed
undesirable, to make him responsible for every act the servant
chooses to do." 11 As Huddart J.A. of the B.C. Court of Appeal has
stated: "The concern is to protect victims of the negligence or
misconduct of employees without imposing absolute liability for all
employee wrongdoing on innocent employers. 12
Such a lack of uniform principle, as well as an additional lack of
consensus on policy concerns, is reflected in recent Canadian trial
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) notes that "in the
Commonwealth at least, in recognition of the fact that a person can be an integral
part of the employee's enterprise without being under the employer's control (a
doctor working in a hospital, for instance), the courts have moved to a test that asks
whether the supposed employee is, in effect, a cog in the defendant's organizational
machinery" (186). See the comments of Lord Denning in Stevenson Jordan and
Harrison, Ltd. v. Macdonald and Evans [1952] l Times Law Rep. 101 (C.A.) at 111;
and see also Co-operators Insurance Assn. v. Kearney [1965] S.C.R. 106.
As employment status was not at issue regarding the perpetrators of the sexual
assaults in B. (P.A.) or in Griffiths, this issue will not be dealt with here. But it will
likely arise in other cases regarding vicarious liability for sexual assault-such as
cases involving doctors and other medical workers who are not part of a hospital's
salaried staff, or foster or group home parents who are not technically considered
employees of the Crown (see in particular the discussion of the latter issue in CA. v.
Critchley [1997] B.C.]. No. 1020 (QL) (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 213-231).
10 Fleming, supra note 7 at 377.
ll See Bugge v. Brown (1919), 26 C.L.R. 110 at 117-18 perlsaacs J.
12 In B.(P.A.), infra note 14 at 18, citing M (F. W.) v. Mombourquette, infra note
13 at 116-17.
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and appeal court decisions on vicarious liability for sexual assault.
On the one hand, scope of employment has traditionally been
assessed in Canada with the Salmond test, which imposes vicarious
liability only where the tortious act may be classified as a "mode"
of performing an authorised act. Under this test, an employer is
generally not to be held responsible for employee torts which
involve a radical departure from authorised employment-related
conduct. As such, vicarious liability seems unlikely to attach to an
employee's act of sexual assault. Rather, sexual assault would seem
more likely to be deemed a completely independent act-a "frolic"
of the employee's own, or a radical departure from employment
duties and objectives in pursuit of personal gratification. This
approach to employee acts of sexual assault was recently taken by
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in McDonald v. Mombourquette, 13
with the result that a Catholic diocese was found not to be
vicariously liable for sexual assaults committed by one of its priests.
But strong opposition to this form of analysis has been raised:
first in a set of trial court decisions in B.C. and Nova Scotia in
which the Salmond test was held to support findings of vicarious
liability for sexual assault, and then, most radically, in two recent
cases in which the B.C. Court of Appeal stated its rejection of the
Salmond Test for the purposes of determining vicarious liability for
sexual assault. These cases were B. (P.A.) v. Curry, 14 in which the
B.C. Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court finding of vicarious
liability, and T. (G.) v. Griffiths, 15 a simultaneously-released decision
in which the same panel of five judges overturned a finding of
vicarious liability. In B.(P.A.)-where the reasoning for the tests
applied there and in Griffiths was set out-the five judges
unanimously declared that the Salmond test's required categorizing
of tortious acts as wrongful modes of performing authorised acts
was inappropriate in cases of sexual assault. Instead, the Court put
forward two new tests for scope of employment, suggesting these
to be more sensitive to the particular context and circumstances of
l3 (1996), 152 N.S.R. (2d) 109 (C.A.), overturning M(F. W) v. Mombourquette
(1995), 145 N.S.R. (2d) 360 (S.C.).
14 (1997), 146 D.L.R. (4th) 72; 89 B.C.A.C. 93; 30 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 [hereinafter
B. (P.A.) cited to B.C.L.R.]; affirming B. (P.A.) v. Curry (1995), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d) 217
(S.C.).
l5 [1997] 5 W.W.R. 203; 89 B.C.A.C. 126 [hereinafter Griffiths cited to
W.W.R.]; overturning T.(G.) v. Griffiths, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2370 (Q.L) (S.C.).
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such cases: on the one hand, a test offered by Huddart J.A. which
focused on conferred authority; and on the other, a more broadlybased proximity test proposed by Newbury J.A. Notably, apart
from the main concern in these judgments to establish a test for
scope of employment in cases of sexual assault which would be
responsive both to case precedents and policy implications, some
concern was also raised (though ultimately deemed irrelevant to the
issue of liability) about the effects of expanded employer liability
on government and private non-profit organizations providing
services to children and other vulnerable groups.
As yet, the matter of the proper test with which to determine
vicarious liability for sexual assault now setting the B.C. and Nova
Scotia Courts of Appeal into apparent conflict has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. But this is about to
change: recently, leave to appeal was granted to the two B.C. Court
of Appeal cases, B. (P.A.) and Grijfiths. 16 Thus the Supreme Court
will soon be in a position to provide much needed guidance as to
whether or under what conditions an employee's act of sexual
assault may give rise to employer liability.
This paper seeks to assess the new tests for scope of
employment put forward in B. (P.A.) and Griffiths in light of some
of the main competing arguments concerning the justifications for
vicarious liability doctrine generally, and in light of the particular
concerns that arise in attaching such liability in cases of sexual
assault. Two key questions are thus raised. First, under what
justification can vicarious liability (ever) be imposed on employers
for employee acts of sexual assault? Is the justificatory model to be
adopted one of corrective justice, under a rights analysis involving
an expanded notion of composite or corporate fault; or one of
distributive justice, under an analysis of economic efficiency and
maximization of overall public welfare? Or is the relevant
justificatory model that of commutative justice, requiring that the
beneficiaries of an enterprise or institution compensate those who
have been subject to systemic enterprise-related injuries?
Alternatively, as is sometimes suggested in the judicial discourse, is
the appropriate model some, perhaps uneasy, combination of these?
Second, with more specific reference to the B.C. Court of
Appeal's two tests: assuming some justification for assigning
l6Leavegranted0ct. 16, 1997, S.C.C. Bulletin 1997, 1843.
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vicarious liability in certain cases of sexual assault, what criteria are
most properly applied in determining liability in any specific
instance? Here, it is suggested that while each of the competing
justificatory models for vicarious liability must hold that the scope
of employment test requires a closeness of connection between the
employee tort and enterprise activity, there is yet some question
within each of these models as to what this connection must consist
in, or how its sufficiency should be determined. In particular, as has
been borne out in the United States and now Canadian cases,
approaches differ in their focus upon, on the one hand, proximity
of acts (or between employee duties and the tortious act), and on
the other, probability of risk. In sexual assault cases, the latter type
of analysis may look specifically to the increased likelihood of such
assaults occuring due to the institution of relationships of power
within the employment context. Exploration of the differing
implications of these two approaches may be aided by a closer look
at the concept of enterprise causation (and the accompanying
analysis of "increased probability of risk" or "characteristic risk"),
invoked in some modern judicial and academic analyses of
vicarious liability, including B. (P.A.), as determinative of the scope
of employment issue.
With this second question, then, concerning the method and
criteria for determining scope of employment in cases of sexual
assault, the two tests of the B.C. Court of Appeal may be critically
assessed. Ultimately, the focus of controversy between H uddart
and Newbury JJ.A. is the significance or weight to be assigned the
employer's conferral of authority to the employee. That is, if the
Salmond test's required classification of the tort as a mode of
performing an authorised act is to be rejected, should the key or
perhaps the only consideration in determining scope of
employment be the nature and extent of any authority conferred
upon the employee-the test of Huddart ].A.? If so, how broadly
or narrowly is the concept of authority to be understood? Or is the
test to be more flexible, admitting not only considerations of
authority, but also functional and formal similarities as well as
coincidences in time or place between employee duties and the
sexual assault-the proximity test of Newbury ].A.? Or, as other
members of the B.C. Court of Appeal have suggested, is the proper
test in cases of sexual assault a combination of these: flexible in
allowing a variety of indications of connection between the

10
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employment role and the tort, while maintaining an emphasis on
conferred authority as an important, and perhaps necessary,
element?
While this paper cannot claim to resolve all of these complex
issues, it will close by setting the B.C. Court of Appeal's new tests
into what is hoped to be sharper relief with the traditional
justifications for vicarious liability doctrine. As such, it will suggest
that it is not corrective nor distributive but commutative justice that
functions as the primary operative justificatory model in B. (P.A.)
and in the context of vicarious liability for sexual assault generally.
With this, some attention will be given to issues of insurance and
insurability, and whether these might be deemed relevant to
employer liability. Ultimately, this is a suggestion that the principle
of commutative justice, as it is invoked particularly in the conferral
of authority test of Huddart J.A., is derived less through an
engaging of first principles under vicarious liability theory than
through the attempt to set the analysis of liability for sexual assault
within a broader analysis of institutional or enterprise-based systems
of authority and power, both public and private, and systemic
abuses of such authority and power. As such, the commutative
justice principle at work in B. (P.A.) may be understood to be
informed by feminist concerns to identify the structural
determinants of sexual assault and abuse, as well as by a basic
notion of civic responsibility for society's most vulnerable.
Here, though, a final question which arises is whether, in cases
of employee acts of sexual assault, the objectives both of fairness
and of feminist-inspired social change are best served by focusing
judicial attention on vicarious liability, with its causation-centred
criteria for scope of employment, or on direct employer liability,
assessed through a more thorough scrutiny of the duty of careideally, a scrutiny which would be sensitive to a variety of
employment-related determinants of sexual assault. Therefore,
alternative headings under which employer liability may be assessed
will be briefly suggested, including negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, and the concept of the non-delegable duty.
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II. B.(P.A.) & GRIFFITHS: FACTS

In B. (P.A.) v. Curry, 17 a five-person panel on the B.C. Court of
Appeal unanimously upheld a trial decision finding the defendant
Children's Foundation vicariously liable for sexual assaults
committed by a residential care worker (Curry) upon a minor at
one of its group homes. Yet in T.(G.) v. Griffiths, 18 a judgment
released simultaneously with B. (P.A.), the same panel overturned a
trial court decision assigning vicarious liability to the defendant
Boys' and Girls' Club of Vernon for sexual assaults committed
upon two minors by the Club's Program Director. Notably, in
Griffiths, a minority of two (on the reasons of Newbury J.A.) would
have assigned vicarious liability for the one assault committed while
the employee was on duty.
The plaintiff in B. (P.A.) had been subjected to acts of sexual
abuse by the residential care worker, Curry, while living at one of
The Children's Foundation's facilities between 1968 and 1971. The
Foundation provided care at this facility to children aged six to
twelve whose needs could not be met in their own homes or foster
homes. In 1980, upon receiving and investigating a separate
complaint of sexual abuse at the facility, The Children's
Foundation dismissed Curry. The plaintiff brought his claim after
Curry was later criminally convicted of gross indecency and
buggery, two of the convictions relating to the plaintiff. Curry's
sexual misconduct with regard to the plaintiff had included acts of
oral sex and anal sex, performed in the boy's bedroom during the
night shift, in the absence of any other employee. Further, Curry
had "bribed and threatened" the boy "to keep [these acts] secret." 19
Of great relevance to the appeal court's finding of vicarious
liability in B. (P.A.) was its assessment of the position of trust in
which Curry had been placed by the Foundation, and which he was
found to have abused. The Court noted that his duties had
included
... ensuring the children went to bed on time ... ensuring
the children bathed or showered themselves ... tucking
the children in at night ... providing an appropriate role
17 Supra

note 14.
note 15.
19 B.(P.A.) supra note 14 at 7.
18 Supra
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model for the children ... dealing in an age appropriate
way with the children's questions regarding sexuality ...
accompanying children on outings and physical
activities ... [and] providing a safe and secure environment
for the children. 20

As such, the Court found, Curry had essentially been entrusted
with the role and duties of a parent.
The appeal in B. (P.A.) was specifically concerned with the Trial
Court's finding of vicarious liability on the part of The Children's
Foundation; indeed, it is important to note that the issue had been
brought to trial as a special case, by which the Court was asked to
consider "only vicarious liability and not to consider any liability of
The Children's Foundation that is founded directly upon any
negligence of The Children's Foundation." 21 While both Huddart
and Newbury JJ.A. indicated that analysis of the Foundation's
direct fiduciary or non-delegable duty22 may have been appropriate
in the circumstances, such alternative heads of liability were not
under consideration. In unanimously upholding the Foundation's
vicarious liability, the members of the appeal court took a few
differing approaches to the issue of scope of employment. These
consisted in two proposed alternatives to the Salmond test (those of
Huddart and Newbury JJ.A.); two proposals that these two new
tests may themselves be reconciled (Hollinrake and Finch JJ.A.);
and one agreement without reasons (Donald J.A.).
In Griffiths, two children (a brother and sister) had been
sexually assaulted by the defendant Griffiths while he was Program
Director of the Boys' and Girls' Club that they attended. The boy
20 Ibid.
21 B. (P.A.)
22

supra note 14 at 34.
The concept of non-delegable duty is invoked by Newbury J.A. in B.(P.A.),
supra note 14 at 35. This is a concept drawn from agency law, whereby certain types
of duty, based in the exercise of statutory authority or the undertaking of dangerous
activities or activities of general importance to the community, cannot be divested
by delegating responsibility to another. The concept is often invoked in the analysis
not of employer liability for acts of employees but for acts of independent
contractors. But the key point here is that the non-delegable duty is a direct duty
owed by the employer to those within foreseeable range of harm, a duty which may
be breached through the negligent or intentional wrongs of those upon whom the
employer has conferred responsibility. See Fleming, supra note 7 at 368-69, 373-74;
Keeton et al., supra note 8 at 197, 511.
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had been sexually assaulted on one occassion at Griffiths' s home,
outside working hours. The girl had been subject to numerous
incidents of sexual assault by Griffiths, including an act of sexual
intercourse when she was thirteen or fourteen. Of these incidents,
only one-an act of sexual touching which occurred during a Clubrelated bus trip-occurred directly in the context of Club activities.
At trial, it was emphasized that Griffiths had seemed "almost
god-like" to the girl at the time. He had been a mentor to these
and other children whose participation in Club activities often
reflected a lack of parental guidance or support at home. The Trial
Judge found Griffiths liable for assault and battery, and found the
Club vicariously liable, holding that although the assaults had not
occurred in the employment setting, they were nonetheless "a
direct result of Griffiths misusing his position at the Club and his
relationship with the children at the Club to seek out and cultivate
victims from among the membership." 23
Yet the B.C. Court of Appeal reversed the finding of vicarious
liability against the Club, though the minority dissented regarding
the one act of sexual touching which occurred on the Club-related
bus trip. In the majority decision, Huddart J.A. held that while the
defendant's employment role had allowed him to develop a
relationship of trust with the plaintiffs, this "opportunity" to gain
the children's trust provided by his employment was insufficient to
establish vicarious liability. Crucially, in the opinion of H uddart
].A., the defendant's job-related authority was not of a sort that
increased the probability of risk of such assaults significantly
beyond the background risks in the community at large.
Both the tests of Huddart and Newbury JI.A. in these cases
accept the general principle that vicarious liability requires a
sufficient "connection" between the employment role and the
tortious act-a connection surpassing "mere opportunity"-but
propose alternative grounds on which the sufficiency of such a
connection might be established. Huddart J.A.'s conferral of
authority test draws particularly on fiduciary theory, and in doing
so offers an interpretation of the doctrine of vicarious liability which
attends to the dynamics of power and vulnerability bound up in the
employee's act of sexual assault, and the extent to which these
power relations may be deemed to flow from the employment or
23 Cited

in Griffiths (B.C.C.A.), supra note 15 at 206.
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institutional context. Newbury J.A., on the other hand, while
acknowledging in a more circumscribed way the relevance of
authority or power dynamics to the analysis of vicarious liability,
proposes a test under which attention is directed across a broader
spectrum of potential connections-temporal, spatial, formalbetween employment duties and the tortious act.
In order to better understand and evaluate these two tests, it
will be useful first to examine more closely the doctrine of vicarious
liability as such, with reference to its historical and modern
justifications. Then we may examine more particularly the
competing tests concerning scope of employment which have been
deemed determinative of such liability, assessing the tests of
Huddart and Newbury JJ.A. among these.

III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY: HISTORICAL AND
MODERN JUSTIFICATIONS

1. Origins of Vicarious Liability Doctrine
Academic treatments of vicarious liability have differed regarding
the doctrine's precise origins, just as they continue to differ
regarding its essential rationale. Oliver Wendell Holmes traced the
historical origins of the doctrine to Roman law-specifically, the
practice of assigning liability to masters for the torts of slaves. 24
Holmes also noted an expansion of this principle in the assigning of
liability to the paterfamilias or head of the household for the acts of
either slaves or family members. 25
It has been suggested by some legal historians that while the
doctrine originally imposed a strict form of liability upon a master
for his servant's torts, this rule was considerably narrowed in the
24

O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881) at 4-38. Of
some note, though, is Thomas Baty's fervent reply to Holmes' theory: "Had the
present-day liability of masters for servants (as O.W. Holmes thinks) been a clear
survival of the liability of masters for slaves, it is inconceivable that it should have
suffered such eclipse before blazing forth again in AD. 1700": (T. Baty, Vicarious
Liability (Oxford: Clarendon, 1916) at 152).
25 O.W. Holmes, "Agency" (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345, at 351-3. The liability of
the pater familas, it may be noted, has recently been revived in Manitoba with the
Parental Responsibility Act, c. PS, C.C.S.M. Under this provision, parents may be
civilly liable for property losses arising from offences committed by their children.
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sixteenth century in favour of a fairness-based concern for direct
fault on the part of the master. Consequently, liability was imposed
only where the employer or master had expressly authorised or
commanded the tortious acts in question. 26 Yet it is generally
agreed that the eighteenth century saw the rise of the concept of the
"implied command," 27 whereby the law allowed that a servant's or
employee's act, though not directly authorised, could yet be
implied by the acts generally authorised within the employment
context. This, it is suggested, marked the dawning of the modern
form of vicarious liability, as the employer's liability was to be
established through an analysis of the act in question and its
connection to employment duties or business activities. 28 Notably,
though, the implied command standard yet had the effect of
denying vicarious liability for intentional torts of employees, on the
argument that "it could not be implied that such acts were
authorized. "29
In an early case indicative of vicarious liability concepts, Jones v.
Hart,3° Lord Holt presented the notion of implied authority in
terms of an "identity" between the employer's and employee's acts.
In that case, a pawnbroker's servant had taken in and then lost the
plaintiff's goods. Lord Holt posed as the basis of the employer's
liability the principle that "whoever employs another, is answerable
for him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him,"
further stating this principle in the form of an identity of acts:
26

Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History" (1894) 7 Harv. L
Rev. 315 at 383, 441. Also see S. Hahn, ''To Protect and Serve: Municipal Vicarious
Liability for a Sexual Assault Committed by a Police Officer" 18 Southwestern
U.L.R. 583 at 587-88; and C. Krueger, "Mary M v. City of Los Angeles: Should a
City be Held Liable Under Respondeat Superior for a Rape by a Police Officer?"
28 U. of San Francisco LR. 419 at 422.
27 Wigmore, supra note 26 at 392. And see Keeton et al., supra note 8 at 500; and
Krueger, supra note 26 at 422. But see Baty, supra note 24 at 148-49.
28 P. Hogg also writes that the modern doctrine of vicarious liability arose with
"the fiction that the master had impliedly commanded the servant to commit the
tort" (P. Hogg, supra note 7 at 86).
29 J. Terry Griffith, "Respondeat Superior and the Intentional Tort: A Short
Discourse on How to Make Assault and Battery a Part of the Job" (1976) 45 U.
Cin. L Rev. 235 at footnote 1. noted in R. Weber, "Scope of Employment
Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed
by Their Employees" (1992) 76 Minnesota LR. 1513 at 1516, footnote 18.
30 (1698) 90 E.R. 1255 (K.B.).
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"[t]he act of a servant is the act of his master, where he acts by
authority of the master." This is essentially equivalent to the dictum
often posed as one of the major touchstones of vicarious liability-a
statement which equally suffices as the rationale behind the law of
agency generally and also the notion of the non-delegable duty: qui
facit per allium facit per se (whoever acts through another acts
through himself).
Notably, insofar as it precedes and reflects the modern conflict
in scope of employment analysis between emphasis upon identity of
acts and upon conferral of authority or trust, in a further case
addressing vicarious liability, this time for an intentional wrongHern v. Nichols-Lord Holt's analysis specifically invoked the
employer's placing of trust upon the employee (and the employee's
abusing that trust) as the basis for vicarious liability. There, a
merchant was held vicariously liable for his agent's having
fraudulently misrepresented the quality of some silk. In the words
of Lord Holt, "seeing somebody must be a loser by the deceit, 1t 1s
more reason [sic] that he that employs and puts a trust and
confidence in the deceiver should be a loser than a stranger." 3!
By the early part of this century, the more formalistic "identity
of acts" rationale seemed to have fallen out of fashion in favour of a
compensation-driven "deep pockets" rationale.32 In his influential
history of vicarious liability, 33 Thomas Baty concluded that despite
multiple purported justifications for vicarious liability doctrineBaty discusses nine such justifications, a multiplicity which he
deems to be in itself indicative of "no very firm basis of policy"34_
3l (1709) 1 Salk. 289 at 289, 91 E.R. 256
32 See, for instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes,

"Agency," supra note 25 at 357. In
recognizing the practical force of this rationale within the modern law of vicarious
liability, Holmes does not endorse it as a legally sound principle.
33 Baty, supra note 24.
34 Ibid. at 148-54. Bary's nine bases of purported justification (somewhat akin, in
his discussion, to the Seven Deadly Sins) are Control, Profit, Revenge, Carefulness
and Choice, Identification, Evidence, Indulgence, Danger, and Satisfaction.
Yet while Baty suggested that vicarious liability must have a
single, unified rationale, Bryandt Smith argued in response that a
multiplicity of justifications is in accordance with a wider notion
of the multiple rationales for and functions of tort law: Why
should a doctrine that has nine reasons to sustain it, assuming they
are not mutually antagonistic, be less rather than more securely
anchored than a doctrine that has only one? The sounder
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none revealed the practice of holding employers liable in the
absence of direct fault to be a principled application of tort law. For
Baty, it was simply the plaintiffs will to reach the employer's deep
pockets that stood as the doctrine's (or for Baty, the dogma's)
essential rationale-a basis of liability which Baty deemed to be in
opposition to the fault-based purposes of tort law, and in turn in
opposition to the demands both of conscience and industry.
In variously elaborated forms, the thesis of an identity between
employer and employee acts; that of the relevance of the
employer's conferral of trust; and that of the deep pocket have
retained force within modern analyses of vicarious liability. At this
point, since the boundaries of vicarious liability under the scope of
employment rule are, in cases of sexual assault as much as any other
form of employee tort, bound up with the doctrine's justificatory
basis, 35 an examination of some of the leading modern justificatory
arguments may be helpful. The arguments surveyed below conform
with three distinct and competing interpretations of the purposes of
tort law: distributive justice, corrective justice, and commutative
justice.

2. Modern Justifications of Vicarious Liability Doctrine

i. Distributive justice: optimal efficiency
Many modern theorists of vicarious liability and courts applying the
doctrine have based their analyses in notions of efficiency under a

practice, though more difficult, in law as in extra-legal affairs, is
to consider the cumulative effect of many reasons for a rule, or,
indeed, to ballance the cumulative effects of many reasons for and
against
(B. Smith, "Cumulative Reasons and Legal Method" (1949) 27 Tex. L.Rev. 454 at
468).
35 G. Keating suggests in "The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise
Liability" (1997) 95 Michigan L.Rev. 1266 at 1274:
In the thicket of the law, the boundary of enterprise liability
[including, for Keating, vicarious liability] is entangled with the
justifications for such liability. The principle of fairness and the
policies of optimal deterrence and optimal insurance draw that
boundary in different places.
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model of distributive justice.36 Such analyses, following upon the
work of Fleming James and Guido Calabresi, 37 as well as P.S.
Atiyah in his influential book The Law of Vicarious Liability, 38 assess
vicarious liability in light of the efficiency-based notions of optimal
risk and loss-spreading and optimal deterrence. The ensuing
conception of vicarious liability is simply put by Prosser and Keeton
as "a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk." 39 The combined
effect of risk and loss-spreading was set out under a wider notion of
"enterprise liability" early in the century by Y.B. Smith, with the
argument that it is "socially more expedient to spread or distribute
among a large group of the community the losses which experience
has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry than to cast
the loss upon a few." 40 As such, Smith reasoned, "the employer
should be made responsible for injuries caused others by his
employees not merely because the employer is better able to pay,
but because he is in a better position than the employees to
effectuate the spreading and distribution of the loss." 41
36 Dennis Klimchuk concisely contrasts corrective and distributive justice,
drawing on the Aristotelian distinction: "Corrective justice is justice in transactions,
distributive justice is justice in holdings." (From notes to a seminar conducted at
Dalhousie Dept. of Philosophy, Nov. 1997). While corrective justice is concerned
to correct correlative losses incurred through one party's infringing another's
rights, distributive justice is concerned to achieve an optimal allocation of resources
across a wider set of individuals. See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics bk. V, ch. 4,
trans. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 114-17.
37 See e.g. F. V. Harper & ]. G. Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts, Vol. I I
(Boston: Little Brown, 1956) at 1370-74; and Guido Calabresi "Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts" (1961) 70 Yale L.J. 499 at 543-46.
38 Atiyah, supra note 7.
39W. Keeton et al., supra note 8, at 500.
40 Y. B. Smith, "Frolic and Detour" (1923) 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444 at 456.
Also see R. Rabin, "Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability"(l996)
55 Maryland LR. 1190, for a recent discussion of the spreading of enterprise
liabiliry theory from the domain of enterprises and products-liability cases to the
sphere of professional service liability. Carried over to this new domain is the
justificatory principle that "ordinary business activity ... involves risks to outside
parties that can best be borne by the enterprise responsible for creating the risks in
the first instance" (at 1203).
4l Ibid. at 460. Similarly, and earlier still, Harold Laski wrote that vicarious
liability is based not in fault but in the understanding that "in a social distribution
of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained"
("The Basis ofVicarious Liability" (1916) 26 Yale L.J. 105 at 112).
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The efficiency aim of optimal deterrence is often invoked along
with risk- and loss-spreading as a rationale for the imposition of
vicarious liability. Thus the assumption is made that the employer is
not only the optimal insurer for employee torts (and, in the wider
ambit of enterprise liability theory, also for non-negligent
enterprise-based accidents), but also, as the one in control of the
enterprise's activities generally, the optimal target for a liability rule
encouraging precautionary measures. As one writer sums up the
leading efficiency-based rationales for general application of
vicarious liability doctrine: "Not only can the employer absorb,
distribute, and shift the costs of injuries, but presumably the
employer will also be more careful in making hiring decisions, in
training and in supervision." 42
While these efficiency-based rationales identify the general
concerns of the economic analysis of vicarious liability, it is not
always clear that the imposition of such liability is the means to
achieving the efficient result. Alan 0. Sykes, whose application of
economic theory to vicarious liability doctrine was particularly
influential on the judgment of Huddart J.A. in B.(P.A.),43 indicates
that a further complexity of analysis is required under the economic
model. Sykes writes:
Economic theory suggests that between any employer and
employee there exists an optimal allocation of the risk of
financial loss attendant upon any judgment against the employee.
This allocation must take into account each party's attitude
toward risk-bearing, the employee's incentives to avoid whatever
conduct might lead to a judgment against him, and the incentives
available to the employer to monitor the employee or otherwise
to guard against the occurance of a wrong.44

Sykes's analysis of vicarious liability acknowledges that while
under idealized conditions, according to economic theory, parties
will contract into an optimal allocation of risk regardless of the
liability rule in place, in practice, significant obstacles to the
42 Hahn, supra note 26 at 589, with reference to Keeton et al., supra note 8 at
500-01.
43 A. 0. Sykes, "The Boundaries of Vicarious liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines" (1988) Harv. Law
Rev. 563.
44 Jbid. at 565.

20

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

efficient result arise. This is so on the one hand because of the high
costs of negotiating and enforcing private risk-allocation contracts.
But further obstacles arise out of the fact that employees may be
insolvent, such that the costs arising from their torts may not be
fully met under an employee liability rule. 45 In such circumstances,
the costs will be forced onto the victim of the tort, and more
generally, society at large.
Among the potential efficiencies of vicarious liability which
Sykes discerns, then, is a cost internalisation rationale, responsive
particularly to the prospect of employee insolvency. Taking
potential employee insolvency into account, an employee liability
rule is not likely efficient. Sykes suggests:
[B]ecause the employer's business does not bear the full cost of
the compensable wrongs attendant upon its operation (either
directly through liability payments or indirectly through wages
paid to employees who make liability payments), its profitability
is inflated relative to what it would be if the employee could pay
judgments in full. In a competitive market, the employer is then
likely to expand production beyond the socially optimal level
because his private marginal costs of production are lower than
the social marginal costs of production. 46

On the deterrence point, though, Sykes adds that:
The ultimate efficiency or inefficiency of vicarious
liability also depends, however, on its effect upon
employees' incentives to avoid wrongful conduct. The
effect of vicarious liability on such incentives depends in
turn upon the devices available to the employer to induce
careful behaviour and the costs of those devices. 47

Among the preventive measures which might stand in place of an
employee liability rule as effective deterrents are direct observation
or supervision of employees' activities, along with intervention to
prevent enterprise-related torts from occurring and threats of
discharging employees for tortious acts.
Yet as Sykes recognizes, "[t]he ability of the employer to affect
the employee's incentives is much more limited, however, when the
45 Ibid.

at 566.
at 567.
47 Ibid. at 569.
46 Ibid.
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employee's behaviour is not easily observed or when the employee
has no interest in maintaining a long-term employment
relationship." 48 It might be suggested that in settings such as
residential care facilities, where employee access to intimate settings
is required and resources are often limited, deterrence measures are
more difficult to institute. Still, it may further be argued with
regard to sexual assault that the potential for criminal culpability
would be as strong a disincentive to the employee as any liability
rule, and that sexual predators are not as such rational actors
responsive to the economic incentives of liability rules. In these
circumstances, then, it might be concluded that the deterrence
rationale does not apply either to the employer or employee.
Alternatively, it might be concluded that employer preventive
measures, however unlikely or ineffectual, are the only potentially
workable form of deterrent. The deterrence rationale, therefore,
would favour an employer liability rule.
Central to Sykes's efficiency analysis of vicarious liability is his
concern to delineate a principle of "enterprise causation" with which
to decide the scope of employment issue. As Sykes suggests, the
analysis of scope of employment is vital to the economic analysis of
vicarious liability, as it is in the interests of efficiency and economic
growth that only those costs proper to employment activities
should be internalized. This avoids the possibility of driving a
productive or socially-beneficial enterprise (which has not forced
hidden costs or "externalities" on society), out of business, or
causing it to contract excessively. In such a case, "society then will
lose at least some of the economic surplus from the production of
the enterprise. "49 This concern to set efficient limits to vicarious
liability with the concept of enterprise causation will be discussed in
Parts IV and V below, with the scope of employment test as
addressed by the B.C. Court of Appeal. There, as Huddart J.A.
suggests, the application of the cost internalization analysis to either
private non-profit or government services requires further
consideration.so
48 Ibid at
49 Ibid at

570.
574.

50 Notably, support for an efficiency-based theory of vicarious liability was
expressed by La Forest J. in his dissenting opinion in London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne
& Nagel International Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, in obiter comments on the
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a. Fairness/Interparty justice Critiques of the Distributive Justice
Analysis

While the efficiency-based conception of vicarious liability under
the model of distributive justice has gained much approval in
modern academic and judicial treatments of the issue, there is also
a persistent current of opposition to this conception. Ernest
Weinrib, in his commitment to a corrective justice model of tort
law, is one who has posed such arguments. For Weinrib, opposition
to the distributive justice analysis of vicarious liability is part of a
wider opposition to what he identifies as the more fundamental
flaw of the economic analysis of torts. In Weinrib's critique,
economic analysis attempts to expand the ambit of this form of law
beyond its proper concern with correlativity, so rejecting what
Weinrib regards as the proper conception of tort law as a rightsbased and transaction-based model for redressing the doing and
suffering of harm between parties. With specific regard to vicarious
liability doctrine, he argues that the efficiency-oriented distributive
justice model fails to explain indemnity laws, as well as this

"developing logic" (at 340) of the vicarious liability regime (at 334-358). There,
Justice La Forest opposed the principle that an employer found vicariously liable
could subsequently claim indemnity from the employee at fault. For, he argued, this
would contravene the efficiency-based requirement that employers bear enterprise
losses.
In support of this claim, he endorsed a set of four essential rationales for
vicarious liability doctrine. First is compensation (the deep pocket principle).
Second is a notion of fairness which reflects both the cost internalization principle
and the principle of commutative justice:
a person, typically a corporation, who employs others to advance
its own economic interest should in fairness be placed under a
corresponding liability for losses incurred in the course of the
enterprise [such that] the cost of such liability is thus internalized
to the profitable activity that gives rise to it [ibid. at 338].
Third is the aim of optimal risk and loss-spreading: the notion that insurance is
more affordable and risks easier to anticipate for the employer than the employee,
such that the employer may pass those losses on through liability insurance and
higher prices. And fourth is the concept of deterrence; that is, vicarious liability is
posed as a form of incentive for corporations to adopt policies reflecting greater
care regarding the tort at issue.
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doctrine's requirement of a legal wrong (the tort of the employee).
In The Idea ofPrivate Law,51 Weinrib writes:
Loss-spreading cannot, however, account for respondeat
superior in its entirety: if respondeat superior were really
based on loss-spreading, not only would it preclude the
further shifting of the loss to the employee, which was
sanctioned in Lister v. Romford lee and Cold Storage Co.
Ltd. [1957] App. Cas. 555 (H.L.), but it would apply
even to injuries that were not the result of the employee's
fault. 52

Economic theorists may have a response to the first of these
concerns, apart from outright opposition to the Lister principle.
Indeed, Sykes writes that the threat of an indemnity action against
the employee might serve economic efficiency in providing a
disincentive to wrongdoing, although such actions are costly and
may be valueless if the employee lacks financial resources.53 As to
Weinrib's second concern, while economic analyses such as Sykes's
do seek to establish a defensible limit to employer liability in the
interests of efficiency, the point holds as to the theoretical
indefensibility under such an analysis of the requirement of a legal
wrong or tortious fault on the part of the employee. Thus one
suggestion raised by the economic analysis of vicarious liability is
that the doctrine is but a subset of a wider model of enterprise and
products liability whereby employers may be made to compensate
for accidents which qualify as characteristic risks, where neither
employer or employee negligence is shown. Insofar as this wider
model of enterprise liability would sanction liability without any
instantiation of tortious fault, with the objective of reducing and
spreading risks and losses across society at large, it exposes more
starkly the conflict between corrective and distributive justice.54
51 Weinrib, supra note 9.
52 Ibid. at 185 footnote 27.

53 Sykes, supra note 43 at 570.
54 This

notion of enterprise causation in the absence of negligence is based upon
the two-pronged u.s. assessment of negligence which considers not only
foreseeability of risk but also the relative cost of precautions. Hence it might be
argued by the economically-minded theorist that in fact a wider principle of
liability for characteristic risks beyond those of negligence is not cost-justified.
Sykes argues that vicarious liability may be cost-justified in the wider context of
economic gains and losses across society at large; in this wider context, the aims of
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Selecting between these models depends upon one's view of both
the formal and social requirements of a defensible approach to tort
law.
Weinrib's brief discussion of vicarious liability doctrine in The
Idea of Private Law invokes the u.s. case Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States,55 in which further critique of the efficiency-based
conception of vicarious liability is raised. There, a sailor returning
from a night of drinking had turned a number of wheels on the wall
of the floating drydock where his ship (a u.s. Coast Guard vessel)
was berthed. This caused the flooding of a set of tanks on one side
of the drydock, such that not only did the ship list and partially
sink, but parts of the drydock sunk as well. In assigning vicarious
liability to the u.s. government (the sailor's employer), Friendly J.
indicated that he nonetheless did not endorse the notion that either
deterrence, loss spreading, or compensation could stand as the
justification for his decision. On the deterrence argument, Justice
Friendly wrote:
It is not at all clear, as the court below suggested, that
expansion of liability ... will lead to a more efficient
allocation of resources. As the most astute exponent of
this theory [Calabresi] has emphasized, a more efficient
allocation can only be expected if there is some reason to
believe that imposing a particular cost on the enterprise
will lead it to consider whether steps should be taken to
prevent a recurrence of the accident.56

In particular, Friendly J. continued, on the facts of Bushey, "the
suggestion that imposition of liability here will lead to more
intensive screening of employees rests on highly questionable
premises." Moreover, application of the scope of employment test
in its more traditional form, so as to deem the sailor's intentional
wrongs outside the scope of employment, might have had greater
preventive effect:
risk and loss spreading along with deterrence justify vicarious liability as an
efficient liability rule. Similarly, in the case of non-negligent accidents or accidents
in the absence of employee fault, it might be argued that imposing liability upon the
employer or enterprise would be more efficient than letting losses fall where they
may.
55 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
56 Ibid. at 170.
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It could well be that application of the traditional rule
might induce drydock owners, prodded by their
insurance companies, to install locks on their valves to
avoid similar incidents in the future, while placing the
burden on shipowners is much less likely to lead to
accident prevention. 57

In Bushey, then, it would seem that the plaintiff drydock owner
and not the defendant employer was in the best position to take
cost-effective precautions. And finally, Friendly J. also challenged
the loss-spreading justification, though essentially reducing this to a
compensation or deep pockets issue:
It is true, of course, that in many cases the plaintiff will not be in
a position to insure, and so expansion of liability will, at the very
least, serve respondeat superior's loss spreading function. See
Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Colum.L.Rev. 444,456 (1923). But
the fact that the defendent is better able to afford damages is not
alone sufficient to justify legal responsibility, ... and this
overarching principle must be talcen into account in deciding
whether to expand the reach of respondeat superior. 58

Thus Friendly J. arrived at a finding of vicarious liability on a
principle not of economic efficiency, but on what was presented as a
principle of fairness. This principle was in essence that an enterprise
should be held responsible for materialization of its "characteristic
risks":
[R]espondeat superior. .. rests not so much on policy
grounds ... as in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business
enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents
which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities.59

Friendly J.'s analysis of the essential rationale for vicarious
liability is thus closely bound up with a particular approach to the
scope of employment issue; that is, justifiable findings of vicarious
liability require identification of an enterprise's characteristic risks,
presented in Bushey as risks foreseeable in a sense other than that
implied under negligence. This idea must be examined further,
along with the notion of enterprise causation, in assessing the B.C.
57 Jbid.

at 170-71.

Jbid at 171.
59 Jbid
58
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Court of Appeal's approaches to scope of employment. Yet insofar
as Friendly J.'s analysis raises the spectre of "fairness" against
prevailing economic analyses, calling into question the distributive
justice rationales whereby vicarious liability is premised on the
notion that the least-cost insurer and taker of preventive measures
against employee torts is the employer, just what this notion of
fairness implies must be further explored. Indeed, the economic
analysis may respond that the notion of responsibility for
characteristic risks raised in Bushey is none other than the costinternalization principle discussed by Sykes, to be embraced as one
important element in a nuanced economic analysis.
So, just what form of justice-as-fairness might be posed as an
alternative to the prevailing efficiency-based interpretation of
vicarious liability is yet a contestable issue. And, as Friendly J.
suggests with his analysis of the least-cost insurer and taker of
preventive measures in Bushey, this is an issue which may affect the
assessing of liability in some cases. In what remains of this look at
the leading justificatory bases for vicarious liability doctrine, then,
interpretations of the doctrine as primarily serving a standard of
fairness and not efficiency will be examined, with reference to the
differing models of corrective and commutative justice.

ii. Corrective justice: The Extension of Employee Fault to Employers
Ernest Weinrib's conception of vicarious liability emphasizes that
the doctrine is not as such one of no-fault liability, but rather may
be found to accord with the notion of fault-based liability which is
required under the model of corrective justice. Thus Weinrib seeks
to interpret vicarious liability in accordance with an emphasis on
interparty fairness or correlativity ("justice in transactions"), 60 as
opposed to the emphasis of distributive justice on justice in
holdings across society at large, or, in its efficiency-based form,
justice as served by overall economic gains.
Liability under corrective justice reflects a correlativity of right
and harm, such that an injustice by which one party infringes
another's rights demands a corrective extraction of compensation
60 See supra note 36. Weinrib writes: "Correlativity locks the plaintiff and
defendant into a reciprocal normative embrace, in which factors such as deterrence
and compensation, whose justificatory force applies solely to one of the parties, play
no role." (supra note 9 at 142).
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from the one who has wronged, in order to restore the position of
the one who has been wronged. Weinrib writes: "Liability is not the
retrospective pricing, licensing, taxing of a punishable act-nor is
the defendant singled out as a convenient conduit to an accessible
insurance pool."61
Under the corrective justice model, then, vicarious liability is
coherent only if the employer may be regarded as in some sense
sharing in the fault of the employee. As such, this interpretation of
vicarious liability draws upon the notion suggested early on by Lord
Holt in Jones v. Hart regarding an identity of employer and
employee acts. Weinrib finds this notion of identity (or "close
association") to be consistent with the logic of correlativity:
Since corrective justice is the normative relationship of doer and
sufferer, respondeat superior fits into corrective justice only if
the employer can, in some sense, be regarded as a doer of the
harm. Corrective justice requires us to think that the employee at
fault is so closely associated with the employer that responsibility
for the former's acts can be imputed to the latter. 62

On this understanding of vicarious liability, then, wrongful
commission of an injury "[w]here the faulty actor is sufficiently
integrated into the enterprise and where the faulty act is sufficiently
close to the assigned task, "63 allows liability to be imputed to the
larger unit of the enterprise or organization. Where such conditions
are met, the doctrine of vicarious liability "construes (indeed,
constructs) the doer as composite: the-employer-acting-throughthe-employee."64
In invoking the notion of a sufficient closeness between the
tortious act and assigned task, Weinrib is not necessarily limiting
the assessment of scope of employment to the traditional Salmond
criteria, requiring the tortious act's ultimate identity with (as a
"mode" of performing) a more general class of authorised act. And
61 Weinrib, supra note 9 at 142. As G. Keating (supra note 35 at 1270) explains
it, in a "rough generalization": "The guiding idea of corrective justice theories is
that the proper end of tort law is the restoration of a preexisting equilibrium
between victim and Injurer, an equilibrium wrongly disrupted by
injurer's ... infliction of harm on the victim".
62 Weinrib, supra note 9 at 186.
63 Ibid at 187.
64 Ibid. at 186.
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even if such a restriction is necessary to trigger employer liability, as
long as such identity does not require an identity of objective, it
might be argued that there is no necessary limit to the extension of
fault under the corrective justice model where the tortious wrong is
intentional, or even criminal.
Further, recalling that Weinrib has cited the judgment of
Friendly J. with apparent endorsement, it may be asked whether
the corrective justice model might admit an analysis of scope of
employment based on assessment of an enterprise's "characteristic
risks." That is, is it possible on this model to impose liability for the
non-negligent imposition of risks by an employer or business
enterprise, with regard to potential wrongs likely to be done by its
employees over and above background risks? A key question arising
here (and one suggested by Newbury J.A. in B. (P.A.)) is how this
analysis of risks could be distinguished from that of reasonable
foreseeability applied in assessing negligence. But given that a
distinction between these types of risk-imposition might be
established (we will look to this further in Part IV), could the
employer's non-negligent risk imposition with regard to employee
torts-including those which might be deemed categorically
different in kind from authorised duties-establish a close enough
association between employer and employee to construct the doer
of harm as the employer-acting-through-the-employee? Here, it
might again be asked under the corrective justice model whether
there is any principled distinction, now under an analysis of
characteristic risks, between extending tortious fault to the
employer for negligent and intentional, and even criminal,
employee acts.
These are questions raised by the B.C. Court of Appeal's
treatment of the scope of employment issue-specifically its
orientation to the principle of enterprise causation, requiring
assessment of increased probability of risk or characteristic risk.
Here it seems this principle opens on to a wider question regarding
the justificatory models for vicarious liability. That is, if indeed the
corrective justice model might admit a principle of employer
responsibility for the non-negligent imposition of characteristic
risks, where these characteristic risks are employee torts, then is the
fault-based approach to assessing vicarious liability significantly
different from the test of enterprise causation, understood under
distributive justice to serve efficiency aims? Or might the corrective

VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT

29

justice model of vicarious liability, despite its primary orientation to
correlativity and fault, converge, at least in part, with that of
distributive justice on the limited point of how best to gauge scope
of employment? Similarities aside, it should again be noted that the
corrective justice model supports liability only for those
characteristic risks that materialize as instances of tortious fault, and
not for all injuries that may be linked to an enterprise's products or
activities. In this respect, and if it is the case that such limits are not
justified by efficiency concerns, it seems it is more properly the
corrective justice model which informs the doctrine of vicarious
liability, or informs the limits of that doctrine.
iii. Commutative justice: the alignment of enterprise benefits and costs

An alternative to either of the above two models of liability, though
one which bears some relationship to the cost internalization
principle forwarded under the distributive justice model, is
suggested by G. Keating in his article, "The Idea of Fairness in the
Law of Enterprise Liability." 65 Keating's analysis, as has been
suggested also of the distributive justice analysis, regards vicarious
liability as a subset of a wider system of enterprise liability, which
includes (in the American system) strict products liability or
liability for accidents where no direct negligence can be shown on
either the employer's or employee's part. Yet this analysis of the
justificatory grounds of enterprise and vicarious liability differs
from that of distributive justice.
The general principle endorsed by Keating as that which
animates enterprise liability requires that enterprises align their
benefits and costs, or spread the costs flowing from profitable
enterprise activities across those who benefit from those activities.
An earlier version of this principle was suggested by Glanville
Williams in 1957: "Just as liability for damage can be equitably
balanced against the defendant's fault, so it can be equitably
balanced against his benefit." 66 Joel Feinberg too had invoked as
one of the rationales of enterprise liability "the benefit principle (of
commutative justice) that accidental losses should be borne

65 Supra note
66 "Vicarious

35.
Liability and the Master's Indemnity" (1957) 20 Mod. L. Rev. 220
at 230. And see Baty, supra note 24 at 32.
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according to the degree to which people benefit from an enterprise
or form of activity."67
Keating traces this burden-benefit principle back to Aristotle's
model of "justice as proportionality," or the proportional alignment
of burdens and benefits, distinguished in the Nichomachean Ethics
from corrective and distributive justice. 68 This is termed by
Keating, following Feinberg, "commutative justice," a principle
which in Keating's interpretation brings together the foundational
moral requirement of assessing tort liability based on conduct with
a particular redistributive aim. Keating writes:
Although the principle of proportionality is concerned with the
distribution of burdens and benefits of accidental risk
imposition, it differs from distributive justice as Fletcher,
following Aristotle, understands it. Distributive justice
distributes goods on the basis of status or virtue. The principle of
burden-benefit proportionality attributes responsibility on the
basis of conduct. It assigns liability to the activity responsible for
the accident, and so parcels out financial responsibility for harm
on the basis of voluntary risk creation. Although the principle of
proportionality is concerned, like corrective justice, with what
has been done, it differs from corrective justice as much as it
differs from distributive justice. Corrective justice seeks to
restore a wrongfully disrupted preexisting equilibrium, whereas
the principle of proportionality seeks to create a new
equilibrium in which the burdens and benefits of accidents are
aligned. The principle of proportionality is, in short, neither
distributive nor corrective, but commutative. 69

Keating's conception of the fair assignment of liability based on
conduct differs from corrective justice, as enterprise liability
"spreads accidents across those who benefit from creating the risks
that result in accidents, rather than simply shifting concentrated
harms from victims to injurers." 7°Further, while this principle is not
necessarily or in all instances in conflict with distributive justice
aims, Keating wishes to affirm the priority of a principle of
responsibility for characteristic risk under commutative justice
67 Doing and Deserving (1970) at 221 footnote 21, as quoted in Keating, supra
note 35 at 1272 footnote 20.
68 See Aristotle, supra note 36, bk. V., ch. 4 at 114-17.
69 Supra note 35 at 1330.
7o Ibid.
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where this results in spreading the costs of those risks which
materialize specifically across those who benefit from the riskimposition over the efficiency-based "policies of accident reduction
and loss dispersion. "71
Keating thus argues that enterprise liability may be understood
through the principle of commutative justice as based in concerns of
fairness and not (or not solely) efficiency. His analysis is premised
upon a conception of tort law as a system of reconciling the
competing claims of liberty and security. According to Keating,
enterprise liability (and so vicarious liability) is the most adequate
means of reconciling these claims where one party is a corporate
body deriving profits from activities imposing systematic risks and
losses upon individuals.
On the one hand, then, Keating suggests that liability in
negligence is concerned with the discrete and independent actions
of individuals and small firms, conceived under a model of
reciprocal risk imposition whereby risks are "equal in probability
and magnitude." 72 In this area of tort law, a single standard of
reasonable precaution allows the best compromise between freedom
of action and security. In contrast, enterprise liability is concerned
with a sphere of activities where the risks imposed between parties
are not equal in magnitude.73 Risks of accident and the accidents
which ensue are systematic and not discrete, imposed unilaterally
upon individuals by corporate bodies which profit from organized
activities involving large scale risk imposition. As such, stricter

71 Jbid.

at 1359. Keating adds:
Conflicts among these principles are hardly endemic. On the
contrary, there is good reason to believe that enterprises are
generally in the best position to control the risks that are
characteristic of their activities, and there is some reason to
believe that they are usually in the best position to insure against
those risks as well.

72 Jbid.

at 1350.
poses the notion of the increased responsibiliry of corporate bodies for
imposing non-mutual risks upon individuals in relation to the traditional treatment
of"special relationships." In such relationships, parties cannot be conceived as "free
and equal": the assumption of positions of authority and trust extends the reach of
responsibility, such that citizens "acquire duties they are not free to disclaim" [Ibid.
at 1326].
73 Keating
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requirements upon such enterprises to bear the costs of freedom of
action are required.
On Keating's analysis, enterprise liability is concerned with the
justifiability of assigning employers the costs of characteristic risks
which materialize in the course of enterprise activities, as opposed to
the justifiability of the enterprise's activities as such. On the one
hand, then, Keating writes: "it is reasonable for enterprises to
impose the nonnegligent risks characteristic of their activities."74
This notion encompasses (in Keating's analysis, which is again
primarily directed not at intentional or even negligent employee
torts but industrial and products-related accidents) most
specifically those risks for which precautionary measures were not
cost-justified-that is, on the American model of negligence
according to the Learned Hand test, those risks for which the cost
of precautions exceeds that of probable harms.75 But, Keating adds,
even in cases of reasonable risk-imposition, it may be "unreasonable
of [enterprises] not to accept responsibility for the financial costs of
those risks."76
In essence, then, Keating' s argument requires that corporations
which reasonably (according to this principle) avoid precautions
should pay out the lesser sum needed to compensate where the risk
materializes. Yet a question this analysis raises is whether a similar
principle would apply in Canadian tort law, with regard to risk
imposition which may be considered non-negligent due not to
reasons of economic efficiency, but, for instance, the non-specificity
of the risk of harm. Or, with regard to employee acts of sexual
assault, might this principle of no-fault compensation be invoked
where the absence of fault is related to the difficulty of detecting
and preventing particular instances of a generally foreseeable abuse
of employee authority, which materializes through covert
intentional acts? In such cases, does Keating' s analysis of the
reasonableness of the enterprise activity despite characteristic risks,
but unreasonableness of not paying out for harms resulting from
those risks, apply? We will address this further, in connection to the

74

Ibid. at 1328.

75This

principle is formulated in US v. Carroll Towing, 159 F. 2d 169 at 173
(2d Cir. 1947).
76 Keating supra note 35 at 1328.
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B.C. Court of Appeal judgments in B.(P.A.) and Griffiths, in Part V
below.
In sum, Keating offers both a general and a specific claim
regarding enterprise (and vicarious) liability:
The general argument for enterprise liability is the argument
that it is fair to make enterprises pay for the accidental injuries
characteristic of their activities whenever doing so will distribute
the financial burdens of those accidents among those who have
benefitted from the underlying risk impositions. The particular
conception is liability for the distinctive risks of an enterprisethose risks it creates that are 'different from those attendant on
the activities of the community in general' [citing Bushey]. 77

The first part of this analysis, which suggests that the principle
of commutative justice is satisfied only where the financial costs of
injuries may be spread across those who benefit from the relevant
risk imposition, raises some further questions. Does this add a
requirement for vicarious liability beyond that of identifying the
tort as a characteristic risk (the latter being a move which it seems
both distributive and, with some possible reservations, corrective
justice models might endorse)? Or is insurability implied in the
notion of the characteristic risk-understood perhaps as a
systematic risk amenable to inclusion in a homogeneous risk pool?
Keating indicates that the type of injury giving rise to vicarious
liability must meet the "basic criteria of insurability," allowing for
the cost-efficient organizing and maintaining of a homogeneous
risk pool.78 Only as such may costs in fact be spread across a class
which benefits from a form of risk imposition. Thus Keating writes,
again with reference to accidental injury:
The critical point is not that the ebb and flow of enterprise
liability has been sensitive to the availability, and perceived
efficacy, of liability insurance, though sensitive it has been. For
our purposes, the critical point is that the fairness of imposing
enterprise liability depends on its ability to connect the financial
costs of accidental injuty with the characteristic risk. The
enterprise liability principle of fairness therefore makes
questions of insurance fundamental.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

at 1360.
at 1336-38.
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We will return to the issue of insurance and insurability, and
whether this may be relevant to findings of vicarious liability in
cases involving sexual assault-and in particular, cases involving
Crown and private non-profit defendants providing services to
vulnerable populations. But first, we must examine the issue of
scope of employment and the B.C. Court of Appeal's two tests in
more detail. In this, the principles of enterprise causation, close
association, and characteristic risks, variously raised by the three
justificatory models of vicarious liability examined here, may be
more specifically assessed.

IV. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT: TRADITIONAL AND
NEW APPROACHES

1. The Traditional Analysis: Proximity of Acts

i. The Salmond Test
The test for scope of employment which has reigned smce the
middle part of this century in England and Canada, such that it is
now deemed "traditional," is the Salmond test, as stated m
Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts.79
While on the first branch of the test, vicarious liability is
imposed for those tortious acts which an employer has actually
authorised, 80 on the second branch:
a master. .. is liable even for acts which he has not authorised,
provided they are so connected with acts which he has authorised
that they may rightly be regarded as modes-although improper
modes-of doing them. In other words, a master is responsible
79 R. F. V. Heuston & R.A. Buckley, 21st ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)
at 443. The Salmond test was affirmed by the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific
Railway Co. v. Lockhart (1942] A.C. 591, and by the Supreme Court of Canada in
WW Sales Limited v. Edmonton (City of) (1942] S.C.R. 467. For reference to
further cases which have applied this test, see Heuston & Buckley at 443 footnote
35.
so Alternatively, it has been suggested (by P. S. Atiyah, supra note 7 for one) that
the first branch of the test concerns those acts which have been actually, impliedly,
or ostensibly authorised. This is of some relevance to the issue of whether the
precedents concerning fraud, decided with regard to the principle of ostensible
authority, have bearing upon cases of sexual assault, which, it is argued, must be
decided according to the second branch concerning unauthorised acts.
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not only for what he authorises his servant to do, but the way in
which he does it. If a servant does negligently that which he was
authorised to do carefully, or if he does fraudulently that which
he was authorised to do honestly, or if he does mistakenly that
which he was authorised to do correctly, his master will answer
for that negligence, fraud or mistake. 81

Under the second branch of the test, then, conduct need
not be authorised to be deemed within the course or scope of
employment. But on the other hand, as the Salmond and Heuston
text continues, "if the unauthorised and wrongful act of the servant
is not so connected with the authorised act as to be a mode of
doing it, but is an independent act, the master is not responsible;
for in such a case the servant is not acting within the course of his
employment but has gone outside of it." The example given is
General Engineering Services Ltd. v. Kingston & St. Andrew
Corporation. 82 There, vicarious liability was denied where the
defendant employer's firemen had deliberately delayed response to
a fire during an industrial dispute, such that the plaintiffs premises
burnt down. Lord Ackner wrote: "Such conduct was the very
negation of carrying out some act authorised by the employer,
albeit in a wrongful and unauthorised mode." 83
Standing alone, the Salmond test does not convey much
regarding what specific criteria should be applied in determining
the relationship between the particular wrongful act of sexual assault
and an employee's authorised acts. Here it may help to look to
specific lines of cases, first those taking traditional approaches to
scope of employment under the Salmond test, and then to those
taking new approaches, most particularly B. (P.A.) and Griffiths at
the B.C. Court of Appeal.

a. Unauthorised Mode or Independent Act?
The notion of the independent act, which under the Salmond test is
contrasted to that of the wrongful mode of authorised action, has
been portrayed in the case law in terms of the servant's embarking

81

Supra note 79.

82 [1989]
83 Ibid at

l W.L.R. 69.
73.
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upon a "frolic of his own." 84 But how is such a frolic or independent
act distinguished from an unauthorised mode of authorised action,
from which vicarious liability may arise?
Fleming suggests that "the less precise the defined scope of the
employee's duties, the more likely that his deviation will be
regarded as a mere mode of performing his authorized tasks." 85 Yet
while this may seem to suggest that specific instructions or
prohibitions might serve to establish certain acts as clearly beyond
the scope of employment, this is not always so. Thus in some cases
vicarious liability has been rejected where an employee disregarded
specific instructions, 86 while in others, an act contrary to instructions
may yet be within the scope of employment. 87
Where the tortious act involves prohibited conduct, the key
issue, according to Fleming, is "whether the order transgressed
actually limited the sphere of employment or merely regulated [the
employee's] conduct within that sphere." 88 In the latter case,
vicarious liability may be imposed for prohibited conduct. This
principle is expressed in Bugge v. Brown, 89 where it was held that a
prohibition relating only to the manner, time, or place of
committing an act would not necessarily exclude from the scope of
employment an employee tort in direct violation of it.9<l
It may be suggested that this attempted distinction between
restrictions on the mode of performing authorised duties and on
84

See J.G. Fleming, supra note 7 at 377 on the notion of "an unrelated and
independent venture of [the employee's] own". And see Joel v. Morison (1834) 172
E.R. 1338; andBoydv. Smith [1931] O.R. 361 (C.A.).
85 J.G. Fleming, supra note 7 at 378. See L.CC v. Cattermoles, [1953] 1 W.L.R.
997.
86 See R. v. Crown Diamond Paint Co. [1983] 1 F.C. 837 (CA); Bickman v.
Smith Motors Ltd. [1955] 5 D.L.R. 256 (Alta. C.A.).
87 See Lockhart v. CP.R. [1942] 3 W.W.R. 149 (P.C.); WW Sales Ltd. v.
Edmonton (City of) [1942] S.C.R. 467. Also see Limpus v. London General Omnibus
Co. (1862) 158 E.R. 993. But see Beardv. London G.O. Co., [1900] 2 QB. 530.
88 J.G. Fleming, supra note 7 at 378.
89 (1919) 26 C.L.R. 110
9<l In J.G. Fleming's example (supra note 7 at 379), referring to Lockhart v.
CP.R., [1942] 3 W.W.R. 149 (P.C.), an absolute prohibition against using private
transport in connection with a business was contrasted with a prohibition against
using uninsured private vehicles. The latter was taken to suggest only the purpose of
transferring liability for damages, and so, according to the court, did not preclude
vicarious liability.
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the actual scope of those duties is problematic and perhaps merely
semantic. Indeed, the reliance on semantics in either broadly or
narrowly defining the authorised act of which the tort may or may
not be a mode has been suggested in Canada, most notably by the
B.C. Court of Appeal, to be the primary problem with the Salmond
test generally. This problem is particularly heightened in cases of
intentional torts, where the inclusion of an intentional or criminal
act amongst authorised employment duties often leads to counterintuitive results.
As we will explore further in what follows, both the courts and
academics have attempted to apply various criteria in order to
elaborate, extend or surpass the Salmond test, and this most
particularly in the case of intentional torts. As Huddart ].A. notes,
the scope of employment issue typically generates "[a] constellation
of questions" involving analysis not only of specific prohibitions and
general authorised duties, but of employee motives, the temporal
and spatial circumstances of the tort, foreseeability of the tort, and
more.9 1 Thus the challenge in broaching the scope of employment
issue is to determine which elements of this constellation accord
best with what is deemed the rationale for vicarious liability
generally, while allowing sensitivity to the particular circumstances
of the tort and employee role at issue.92
ii. Proximity ofActs and Intentional Torts
a. Motivation to Serve Test: Assault Cases

Particularly in early cases, the test for scope of employment has
sometimes had particular regard for the connection (or lack of
connection) between the employee's purposes in committing the
wrongful act and the employer's purposes generally, so limiting
employer liability to those instances in which the tortfeasor was
91 B. (P.A.),

supra note 14 at 22.
recent account of the different conceptual models under which the scope of
employment is assessed is given by Susan Vella in her article "Balancing Power
With Responsibility: Institutional Liability in Sexual Assault Claims" in Sexual
Abuse: The Civil Remedy, Dept of Continuing Legal Education, (Law Society of
Upper Canada, 1993). Vella suggests four categories of test regarding the scope of
employment which are of relevance to claims of vicarious liability for sexual assault
(at 8). While these tests are categorized slightly differently in this paper, I believe
there is no substantial conflict with Vella's position.
92 A
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acting in desired furtherance (under a standard of reasonableness)
of the employer's objectives. 93 In more recent times, while motive
has not generally been deemed relevant under the Salmond test,94
this appears to be subject to an exception in cases of assault. Thus
some cases suggest that an employer will not be liable for an
employee's act of assault unless it "was prompted by a desire to
further the interests of his employer and was reasonably incidental
to his allotted duties."95
In some cases, then, acts of aggression which cannot reasonably
be construed as in desired furtherance of the employer's interests
have been deemed unamenable to a finding of vicarious liability.%
Under this principle, too, excessive use of force, even where some
force is authorised, may be deemed outside the scope of
employment.97 In certain assault cases, the rejection of vicarious
liability has reflected in part the insufficiency of other bases of
connection between the tortious act and employment role, besides
employee purpose and the amount of force applied.9s
Yet in other assault cases, vicarious liability has been found
where the employee's acts may be regarded as the desired
performance of duties involving an explicit or implicit authorisation

93 See

Willes J. in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 259.

94 See Heuston & Buckley, supra note 79 at 448.

95 Hayward v. Georges [1966] V.R. 202. The Salmond and Heuston text states:
"[T]he courts have shown a distinct reluctance to hold an employer liable for
aggressive acts committed by a servant even though they are generated by the latter's
employment" (ibid. at 448).
% See Griggs v. Southside Hotel Ltd. [1947] O.R. 674 (C.A), (a barman's
assaulting a patron was deemed to have occurred due to sudden provocation, not in
attempting to eject the plaintiff). Also see Deatons v. Flew (1949), 79 C.L.R. 370;
Pontin v. Katapodis (1962), 108 C.L.R. 177; and Keppel Bus Co. v. Ahmad [1974] 1
W.L.R. 1082 (P.C.).
97 See the statement of this principle in Poland v. john Parr and Sons, [1927] 1
K.B. 243 at 245 (C.A). The principle is also acknowledged in Cave v. Ritchie
Motors Ltd. (1972), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 141 at 144 (B.C.S.C.), where Berger J. held that
even if the car salesman had had the authority to eject customers, the force used in
the incident in question "was so excessive that it went quite beyond the limits of any
authority he had."
9S Thus locale is of some importance in McLeod v. Murphy [1988] B.C.W.L.D.
184 (C.A), and in Daniels v. Whetstone Entertainments [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1
(C.A.).
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to use force. 99 Two notable examples in the Crown contextioo are
Abbott v. Canada 101 and Peeters v. Canada. 102 Both cases involve
excessive or unnecessary use of force by prison guards and suggest
that, where some use of force is authorised and further, it may be
implied, where employees are placed in a position involving a high
degree of trust, vicarious liability may arise. Peeters in particular, in
99 An early example of such a case is Twerdochlib v. Hanns [1935] 1 W.W.R. 533
[1935] 2 D.L.R. 363 (Alta. CA), where a beer hall proprietor was liable for his
employee's negligently causing death in ejecting a patron. Similarly, see Wenz v.
Royal Trust Co., [1953] O.W.N. (H.C.). In Cole v. California Entertainment Ltd.
[1990] Doc. V00861 (B.C.C.A.), the employer of some bouncers was vicariously
liable for assault where he had issued instructions to clear a doorway, leaving the
means of doing so to the bouncers' discretion. Also see Bellcourt v. Edmonton Royal
Hotel Co. (1979), 19A.R. 50 (QB.), andRosev. Plenty [1976] 1 W.L.R. 141. Some
of these cases are discussed by F.D. Rose in "Liability for an Employee's Assaults"
(1977) 40 Modern L.R. 420; and seeB.(P.A.), supra note 14 at 27-28.
100 The doctrine of vicarious liability applies to the Crown by the operation of
section 3(a) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50 title
am. 1990, c.8, s.21 [hereinafter CLP.A.]. Section 3 of the CLP.A. states:
The Crown is liable in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private
person of full age and capacity, it would be liable
(a) in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown; or
(b) in respect of a breach of duty attaching to the ownership, occupation,
possession or control of property.
101 (1993), 64 F.T.R. 81 (Fed. T.D.) [hereinafter Abbott]. In Abbott, the Crown
was found vicariously liable for assault, battery, negligence and false imprisonment.
This case involved a prison guard's wounding and otherwise assaulting an inmate
during an altercation in which the plaintiff was not directly involved; upon return
from hospital, the inmate was placed in segregation. The court assigned vicarious
liability to the Crown despite the fact that the guard's discharging the firearm in
the circumstances was in contravention of Corrections regulations.
102 (1992), 54 F.T.R. 289, affirmed (1993), 108 D.L.R. (4th) 471 (Fed. C.A.)
[hereinafter Peeters]. In Peeters, the Crown was held vicariously liable for assault
and battery when a prisoner was beaten by a group of guards escorting him to
hospital after a hostage taking. While the Crown in that case admitted vicarious
liability for the assaults at trial, it tried to argue at the Federal Court of Appeal that
it was nonetheless 'blameless', and so should not be subject to punitive damages. In
response the court held that, despite evidence of relevant prohibitions and
precautions on the part of Corrections, the fact that the authorised duties of the
guards involved the use of force, and force had been unnecessarily applied, justified
the finding that Corrections was both vicariously liable and blameworthy. In
particular, the implication was made (in the absence of a finding of negligence on
this point) that insufficient training had been provided. Thus the Court of Appeal
affirmed the assigning of punitive damages.
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assigning punitive damages to the Crown along with its finding of
vicarious liability, suggests that public authorities which place
employees in positions of significant power or authority may be
held to a strict standard of responsibility when that authority is
abused. Again, though, such a finding is premised on there being
some authorization of the use of force. Moreover, it is less clear, on
the Salmond-based reasoning applied here, that vicarious liability
would arise from an employee's use of a different type of force than
that which was authorized; such an argument might be used to
deny vicarious liability for an employee's act of sexual assault.
In her assessment of the case law on vicarious liability for
assault, Huddart J.A. suggests in B.(P.A.) that "courts are reluctant
to impose liability on an employer vicariously for an employee's
assault where the sort of violence used was not authorized, and
where the assault was not committed in furtherance of an employer
purpose." 103 As such, Huddart J.A. deems the assault cases to be
inappropriate precedents for determining vicarious liability for
sexual assault. Rather, she draws analogies to cases involving fraud
and theft, which in some instances have given rise to vicarious
liability despite personal motives contrary to employer purposes.
These alternative precedents are discussed below, as we take up
Huddart J.A.'s reasoning in B.(P.A.) in more detail. But first, it
may be helpful to set the stage with an earlier attempt to surpass the
Salmond test and render it more applicable to intentional torts,
through the notion of foreseeability.

b. Foreseeability: from Salmond to Atiyah
In determining whether unauthorized or prohibited conduct will
give rise to employer liability, some importance may be placed on
whether the wrongful act in question may be regarded as a broadly
foreseeable risk of the employer's business-or, in what 1s
sometimes presented as an equivalent concept, whether the act is
among the broad risks incidental to the enterprise. 104
103 B. (P.A.),

supra note 14 at 29.
scope of what may be considered reasonably incidental may be broad. In
Century Ins. v. NL Road Transport [1942) AC. 509, a truck driver's striking a
match to light a cigarette while transferring gas to an underground tank, resulting
in an explosion, was regarded as within the scope of his employment, despite an
express prohibition - this because smoking, though for the employee's personal
104 The
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According to the principles of negligence, a defendant will be
liable for the harm that materializes from the creation of an
unreasonable risk. 105 In Weinrib's account, the requ1s1te
foreseeability must be of "a more limited category of injury than
injury simpliciter."Hl6 This is so because liability for an excessively
general risk would effectively delegitimize action, as all action has
some risk of injury; instead, it is necessary to be able to anticipate
the risks contingent upon a certain action rather than another. The
broadness or specificity of the risk at issue in any particular case is
not determined according to a set formula, but rather demands a
judgment about "what, on the facts of a specific case, is the sort of
consequence that a reasonable person ought to have anticipated and
guarded against." 107
Vicarious liability doctrine, in contrast, does not countenance
considerations of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the risk.
Still, foreseeability has been raised as a means of assessing liability
under the scope of employment test leading to questions of how
specific a risk must be foreseen, and whether intentional employee
wrongs should be regarded as foreseeable, particularly where the
wrongs at issue are criminal and on some level shocking. Moreover,
questions arise as to how such considerations of foreseeability may
be distinguished from the assessment of direct liability m
negligence.
The suggestion of applying a test of foreseeability in
determining vicarious liability is raised by Atiyah in Vicarious
Liability in the Law of Torts. 108 Atiyah proposes a reformulation of
the Salmond test, involving consideration first of what the
employer has expressly, impliedly, or "ostensibly" authorised his
employee to do; 109 and second, whether there is a substantial risk

benefit, was to be regarded as a normal, though regretable, incident during the
performance of most kinds of work. Yet in Kirby v. NCB. (1958) S.C. 514, a
miner's lighting a cigarette in a prohibited area was not regarded as giving rise to
his employer's liability, as the conduct could not be treated as but a prohibited
mode of performing an authorized task.
105 See Weinrib, supra note 9 at 147-48; 164-67.
106 Ibid. at 166.
107 Ibid at 167.
!OS Supra note 7.
!09 Ibid. at 178.
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that, in doing this, the employee will commit a tort of the kind he
has committed. no
Atiyah discusses the potential of applying a broadly-conceived
foreseeability test after the analysis of employee authority, at the
second stage of analysis of incidental risks:
When one moves to the next stage of asking what risks ought
fairly and reasonably to be considered incidental to a particular
type of business there is a strong argument in favour of treating
foreseeability as an important factor. If it can be foreseen that an
enterprise cannot be profitably carried on without involving
certain types of risks there is clearly much to be said for treating
that sort of risk as an inevitable concomitant of that type of
enterprise. But it must be stressed that here again a broad
perspective is required. One is not looking here at a particular
incident and asking whether that could have been foreseen, in the
way that the law does when questions of negligence are in
issue .... From the broader point of view it must be recognized
that, whatever precautions are taken to avoid particular events,
and however much care and skill is used in carrying on an
enterprise, certain types of accidents are more or less inevitable.
And where, from this broad point of view, such accidents are
foreseeable, policy would seem to point strongly in favour of
holding the employer liable. 111

Thus a form of general foreseeability is invoked. Atiyah
distinguishes this from foreseeability of a particular incident, or a
particular instance of the type of accident (or, it may be added,
employee tort) which is broadly foreseen. Such a generally
conceived foreseeability does not imply an unreasonable imposition
of risk or a breach of duty. As suggested above, Friendly J. in
Bushey invoked a similar test of foreseeability for assessing vicarious
liability. Friendly J. cited Harper and James: "The foresight that
should impel the prudent man to take precautions is not the same
measure as that by which he should perceive the harm likely to flow
from his long-run activity in spite of all reasonable precautions on
his own part." 112 Yet how broadly, on Atiyah's test, might the risks
at issue be construed? Would an open-ended risk of injury pursuant
no Ibid. at 183.
lll

Jbid at 172.

112 Harper

& James, supra note 37 at 1377-78.
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to abuse of employee authority be admissable? Or might the
analysis have regard to the statistical probability of particular types
of accidents or employee torts? Such approaches may be limited by
the first stage of Atiyah' s test, requiring identification of the
employee's particular type of authorised duties, with the risk
analysis then referring to risks incidental to the specified type of
act.113
While Atiyah on the one hand endorses a notion of vicarious
liability based on the materializing of broad risks incidental to
enterprise activities, he also makes some suggestion of the
unlikelihood that intentional torts or wilful acts will be admitted
under such broadly defined risks. Still, he suggests that policy
considerations might lead courts to stretch the limits of
foreseeability for certain intentional torts of frequent occurrance.
These comments occur in a passage which calls for the rejection of
the Salmond test in assessing intentional torts yet simultaneously
places what Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.) considers unwarranted
restrictions on liability for intentional torts. Atiyah writes:
Instead of asking what acts the servant was engaged in
performing when he committed the tort, and whether
the tort was merely an improper mode of performing an
authorised act, it would be preferable if the courts were
to ask, e.g., is the servant's tort an act of a kind
sufficiently similar to the acts he has been authorised to
perform?; is there a substantial risk that the employer's
object cannot be achieved without torts of this kind
being committed by his servants? In general the risk of a
negligent act is clearly much greater than the risk of
wilful wrongdoing by a servant.... On the other hand,
certain types of wilful acts, and in particular frauds and
thefts, are only too common, and the fact that liability is
113 The potential for employer liability for broadly foreseeable risks was
acknowledged in the context of an intentional employee tort in obiter by Berger ].
in Cave v. Ritchie Motors, supra note 97 at 144. There, Berger]. invoked the notion
of foreseeability with reference to Atiyah' s two-stage rest, and suggested that if it had
been established that the salesman in that case had the authority to eject customers,
"the risk that excessive force would be used might well be foreseeable." Thus he
concluded that "[i]t might well be appropriate to hold an employer liable in such a
case." In such a case, it seems, both the Salmond and Atiyah tests might be satisfied,
insofar as the general type of act which was abused, the use of force had been
authorised.
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generally imposed for torts of this kind shows that the
courts are not unmindful of considerations of policy. 114

Huddart J.A. responds: "Atiyah's emphasis on authority as the
first enquiry and on risk assessment as a corollary consideration
reflect a policy designed to limit more stringently an employer's
burden for an employee's deliberate wrongdoing than for the
employee's negligent wrongdoing." 11 5 It would seem her response is
based both on Atiyah's suggestion that intentional torts are less
likely to be deemed broadly incidental risks, and further, on the
potential for the initial authority inquiry merely to duplicate the
errors of the Salmond test, in its requirement of a sufficient
similarity between authorised and wrongful acts.
The potential for the Atiyah test to limit employer liability for
intentional torts was reflected in Plains Engineering Ltd. v. Barnes
Security Services Ltd.11 6 There, a security guard's committing arson
on a customer's premises was deemed not to give rise to vicarious
liability. While the decision turned upon the lack of a prior
relationship between the employer and plaintiff, it was mentioned
in obiter that the question of foreseeability could be determinative
in such cases. That is, the court suggested that arson was in this case
neither reasonably foreseeable nor incidental to the guard's duties,
nor reasonably interpreted as a mode of performing those duties.
As such, this argument suggests the potential for convergence
between Salmond test-based notions of unauthorised mode versus
independent act and the analysis of foreseeability, both supporting
the notion that the wrongful act "involved so substantial a departure
that the servant must, pro hac vice, be regarded as a stranger vis-avis his master." 117 This, as we will see, was essentially the argument
accepted by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in McDonald v.

114 P.

S. Atiyah, supra note 7 at 263.

115 B. (P.A.), supra note 14 at 14.
116 (1987), 43 CC.LT. 129 at 150

(Alta. Q.B.). But note the recent B.C. Supreme
Court decision B.C. Ferry Corp. v. Invicta Security Service Corp. (1997) 35 C.C.L.T.
(2d) 182, which applies the reasoning of the B.C. Court of Appeal in B.(P.A.) to find
the vicarious liability of a security company for an act of arson committed by its
guard. There, the fact that the security company had given the guard exclusive
responsibility for security of the premises, amounting to total control of the
premises, was key.
117 J. G. Fleming, supra note 7 at 380.
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Mombourquette, 118 in overturning a finding of a diocese's v1canous
liability for sexual assaults committed by its priest.
The application of a foreseeability test to scope of employment
issues has been adopted in some u.s. jurisdictions. 119 Yet while some
courts and commentators argue in favour of a broadly conceived
test along the lines which Atiyah suggests, 120 others use the test to
reject employer liability for such intentional torts as may be
deemed to involve "shocking" or "outrageous" conduct. 121 Sexual
assault in particular has been identified by some of these courts as
falling outside foreseeable risks of employment.
118 Supra

note 13.
Restatement (Second) of Agemy (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 1958)
provides a narrow test for scope of employment, requiring an identity in kind
between authorised acts and the employee tort, as well as of employer and employee
purpose. But tests for scope of employment vary between states. The California test
allows the assignment of vicarious liability if either of two tests is met: "1) the act
performed was either required or 'incident to his duties' or 2) the employee's
misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer in any event" (from Clark
Equipment Co. v. Wheat 154 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1979). See C. Krueger, supra
note 26 at 432-37.
120 See Weber, supra note 29 at 1534, for an argument in favour of a 'broad'
foreseeability test:
119 The

When courts use the outrageousness standard, they are asking
whether the risk is foreseeable, or whether it is so unusual or
outrageous that it should not be characterized as part of the job.
Courts that use this standard often unwittingly rely on
negligence principles rather than on respondeat superior.
on
what
can
reasonably
be
Negligence
focuses
avoided ... Respondeat superior, on the other hand, focuses on the
risks of an enterprise; it is foreseeable that a teacher may abuse his
authority, even though the precise manner in which he does so
may not be specifically foreseeable. Foreseeability is relevant to
respondeat superior only in an evaluation of what is a general
foreseeable risk of a business.
121 Thus in Bates v. United States 701 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1983), where an onduty military policeman had raped and murdered teenagers on a military base,
vicarious liability was found not to arise. For, the court reasoned, the acts at issue
were "so outrageous and criminal, so excessively violent as to be totally without
reason or responsibility". Cited in Weber, supra note 29 at 1525. Also see Desotelle
v. Continental Casualty Co., 400 N.W.2d 524 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (sexual assault
committed by an on-duty sherrif in his squad car); and Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F.
Supp. 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (rapes committed by police officers constituted
outrageous and so not "expectable" conduct).
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It may be suggested that such judgments ignore the broad or
general foreseeability proper to vicarious liability in favour of a
more limited foreseeability, circumscribed by the impossibility of
anticipating the particulars of an employee's intentional tort, or
perhaps, circumscribed by moral indignation. But where the risks at
issue are the intentional wrongs of moral agents, particular concerns
do arise, if not for a strict statistical or probability-based analysis of
causation, then for the more traditional orientation towards fault
which is closely bound up with the very notion of foreseeability.
The emphasis of some courts upon foreseeability in denying
vicarious liability for some forms of intentional employee torts
reflects a perception of injustice in holding the employer responsible
for intentional and criminal acts which were not reasonably
foreseeable with any specificity. 122 With the imposition of vicarious
liability for such acts, it is suggested in this foreseeability-regarding
approach, the moral quality of the enterprise's acnvmes is
impugned. Yet insofar as, in Canada at least, vicarious liability for
some forms of intentional tort is possible, the distinction between
extreme and less shocking wrongs may be difficult to maintain, and
a strict probability analysis may be the only consistent approach.
Ultimately, then, it may be that the concept of foreseeability is,
as Newbury J.A. suggests in B. (P.A.), too much bound up with
direct liability or fault to be of assistance in determining the proper
limits to scope of employment in the assessment of vicarious
liability. Yet it must also be noted that just as, in the law of
negligence, liability for an excessively general risk effectively
delegitimizes action, so in the law of vicarious liability, imposing
liability upon businesses or public authorities for a generallyconceived risk of injury resulting from abuses of employee
authority, with no further limiting factors, might effectively
delegitimize industy, along with institutions serving the vulnerable
and needy.

122 Similarly, in the area of products liability in the u.s., foreseeability has been
suggested as an appropriate addition or alternative to strict liability, in what seems
an attempt to inject into the analysis some consideration of direct fault. Thus Rabin
writes: "there is a strong inherent perception of injustice in holding a company
responsible for risks that it had no reason to know about at the time that it put a
product on the market" (Rabin, supra note 40 at 1205).
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Perhaps a more promising way of framing the analysis of
characteristic or incidental risks for the purposes of vicarious
liability is that which is suggested by Sykes, and endorsed by
Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.), under the heading of enterprise causation.
Such a test may assess increased probability of risk without specific
regard for foreseeability and its implications of direct fault, and
perhaps give more guidance regarding the requisite risk. Whether
such an analysis might displace the whole range of considerations of
close connection in favour of an analysis directed specifically at
conferred authority will be a further important question. First,
though, we will look to the case law denying vicarious liability for
sexual assault on the principles explored so far.
iii. Sexual assault as insufficiently proximate: McDonald v.
M ombourquette
McDonald v. Mombourquette 123 was an action brought by a former
altar server (McDonald) against a priest and the Roman Catholic
and Episcopal Corporation of Antigonish for damages arising from
three incidents of sexual assault occurring between 1969 and 1971.
The action was brought under the headings of negligence, vicarious
liability, and breach of fiduciary duty. At trial, the diocese was held
vicariously liable for the priest's negligence. But on appeal this
finding was overturned on the reasoning that Mombourquette' s
sexual misconduct had been not only wilful (and so not negligence
per se) but the antithesis to the religious tenets of his office. Thus
the assaults were deemed to have been beyond the course of
em ploymen t. 124
For the Trial Court, Mombourquette's acts of sexual assault
were considered sufficiently connected to his authorised duties, in
view of his role as representative of Church authority to the
123 Supra note 13 [hereinafter McDonald].
124 In sum, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal

in McDonald found that 1) the
lower court had erred in finding that Mombourquette's acts had constituted
negligence rather than wilful acts (and insofar as the Nova Scotia Limitation Act has
a shorter limitation period for assault, the limitation period was deemed to have
expired); 2) the priest's acts of sexual assault were outside the scope of his
employment, and so did not give rise to vicarious liability; 3) there was no evidence
of negligence on the part of the Church in appointing or supervising
Mombourquette; and 4) there was no established breach of fiduciaty duty on the
part of the diocese.
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community and particularly to children. The Court invoked the
notion of fiduciary relationship to convey the connection between
the authority conferred upon Mombourquette and his wrongful
acts:
[I]f a church clothes a spiritual advisor to recruit young people
as altar servers and to involve youth in activities that increases
[sic] the fiduciary relationship between the advisor and the child,
then in circumstances where there is an abuse within the confines
of that authoriry, such is not remote.... Without the authoriry
and power of control over children provided by the Diocese, the
wrong could not have occurred.1 25

While this finding of sufficient connection between the
employment role and tort on the part of the Trial Court was
presented as an application of the Salmond test, the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal applied the same test and found an insufficient
connection. Jones J.A. for the Appeal Court suggested that the Trial
Court had misapplied the test: "the test is not simply that an
employee is placed in a position of trust and authority that provides
the opportunity to do wrong. Applying that test employers would
be liable for all wrongful acts of their employees." 126 Again, the key
point for the Appeal Court was that the priest's sexual assaults had
been "totally contrary to the religious tenets which he has sworn to
uphold. " 127 Thus both a motivation-to-serve test and a Salmondbased analysis, finding that the tort did not qualify as a mode of
performing authorised duties, were applied.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in McDonald referred to Cave
v. Ritchie Motors, 128 Plains Engineering, 129 and General Engineering
Services, 130 which limit the scope of employment through reference
to employer objectives. 131 Further, it invoked two Canadian cases
125 McDonald (N.S.S.C.), supra note 13 at 377.
l26 McDonald (N.S.C.A.), supra note 13 at 116-17.
127 Ibid. at 123.
128 Supra note 97.
129 Supra note 116.
l30 Supra note 82.
l3l Notice is also tal(en of fraud and convers10n cases in which conflict of
employer and employee objectives does not prevent vicarious liability; the attempt is
then made to distinguish McDonald as involving a wrongful act which, unlike the
fraud and conversion cases, is insufficiently connected to the area of authority
conferred.
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on the issue of vicarious liability for sexual assault: Barrett v.
'Arcadia 132 and Q. v. Minto Management Ltd. 133 In these cases, an
employee's act of sexual assault was held to have been outside the
scope of employment and vicarious liability was denied. Also, Jones
].A. for the Appeal Court referred to a number of u.s. decisions
where vicarious liability for sexual assaults by clergymen had been
denied. 134
Jones ] .A. suggested that his finding in McDonald was not
necessarily in conflict with the principles applied by the B.C.
Supreme Court in B. (P.A.) v. Curry1 35-at this point, B. (P.A.) had
not been heard by the B.C. Court of Appeal. For in distinction
132

(1977), 2 CC.LT. 142 (B.C.S.C.). In Barrett v. 'Arcadia', the defendant
company was found not to be liable where its employee, an officer's steward, posed
as a cabin steward, entered the plaintiff's state room and assaulted her. As the
employee did not have authority to enter the area in which the assault occurred, the
act was considered to have been performed in service of a private and personal
interest, rather than under cover of conferred authority. The analysis turned in part
on the issue of the disparity between employer and employee objectives. But
otherwise, it seems to have relied less upon an analysis of the difference or similarity
of the act of sexual assault to any authorised acts of the steward than the steward's
lack of authorised access to the room. Such an analysis may be regarded as loosely
based upon the principle of ostensible authority, to be suiveyed below with the
fraud and conversion cases.
l33 (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 531 (H.C.J.), affd (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 781 (C.A.). In Q
v. Minto Management Ltd., the landlord of an apartment complex was found not to
be vicariously liable for a maintenance man's rape of a tenant in her apartment. The
court placed some importance on the fact that the employee did not have authorised
access to tenants' apartments. Here, though, the landlord was found to have been
negligent in not adequately responding to previous assaults by enhancing security.
l34 These include Destefano v. Grabian (Colo.S.C. 1988), 763 P.2d 275 and
Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans 615 So.2d
410 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993). See also Gibson v. Brewer [1966] W.L. 93511.
Further u.s. precedents for the finding that sexual assault is beyond the scope of
employment were raised in B. (P.A.), supra note 14. These include Boykin v. District
of Columbia 484 A.2d 560 (D.C. App. 1984), where the connection between
authorised physical touching by the coordinator of an educational program and
sexual assault was deemed 'too attenuated' to give rise to vicarious liability. Also
noted was Doe v. Village of St. Joseph, Inc. 415 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. App. 1992), which
denies a boarding school's vicarious liability on the basis of a motivation to serve
test. In Jeffery Scott E. v. Central Baptist Church 243 Calif. Rptr. 128 (Ct. App.
1988), a foreseeability test was applied to deny vicarious liability. See also John R. v.
Oakland Unified School District (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 438 (Cal. S.C); and Desotelle v.
Continental Casualty Co., 400 N.W.2d 524 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
l35 Supra note 14.
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from the role of the priest in McDonald, the duties of the assailant
in B. (P.A.), a residential care worker, involved "total intervention"
in the lives of the minors in his care: "[T]he Foundation's
employees were expected to act as parent figures in the supervision
they provided, which involved physical contact associated with
daily activities such as bathing and putting the children to bed each
night." 136 Thus Jones J.A. suggested that a broader range of
authorised intervention in a child's life implies an increased scope of
employment and an increased likelihood of vicarious liability.
Notably, despite the commitment of the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal to the Salmond test, this assessment of the relevance of
differing types or degrees of employee authority bears some
similarity to that expressed by Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.) and, more
particularly, Griffiths.
2. Beyond the Salmond Test: Alternative Analysis in B.(P.A.) and

Griffiths
i. Rejection of the Salmond Test
Lowry J. for the Trial Court in B. (P.A.) applied the Salmond test
for scope of employment and, on an argument similar to that of the
Nova Scotia Trial Court in McDonald, had found vicarious liability
to flow from Curry's acts of sexual assault. This finding was based
on the fact that The Children's Foundation had placed Curry in a
position of authority and trust, which involved a wide scope of
authorized intervention in the lives of the children in its care, in
order to promote their emotional and physical well-being. Applying
the Salmond test, Lowry J. reasoned that the degeneration of
authorized conduct into protracted sexual abuse "was nonetheless a
mode (albeit a most wrongful and dearly unauthorized mode) of
[Curry's] conducting himself while undertaking the responsibilities
of his employment for which he was engaged."137
Yet the Appeal Court in B. (P.A.) unanimously rejected the
Salmond test as inappropriate for intentional torts and particularly
for sexual assault. In this decision, Huddart J.A. suggested that
while the test may be helpful in assessing scope of employment in
cases of negligence, it is of little help in assessing employer liability
(N.S.C.A.), supra note 13 at 120.
(B.C.S.C.), supra note 14 at 222-23.

l36 McDonald
137 B(P.A.)
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for intentional torts. 138 Newbury ].A. emphasized the Salmond
test's indeterminacy, due to its semantic flexibility regarding classes
of authorised conduct and unauthorised modes of conduct:
"Ultimately it comes down to semantics, depending simply on the
specificity with which one defines the employee's normal duties." 139
As to employee acts of sexual assault, both judges suggested that
applying the Salmond test led to counter-intuitive results. Newbury
].A. wrote: "[t]he ordinary person would surely reject the
suggestion that sexual assault is not qualitatively different from
touching a child to bathe him or put him to bed at night."140
Huddart J.A. also pointed out the inadmissability of justifying
vicarious liability in this way: "The Salmond test requires a
conclusion that the sexual assault of a child is an unauthorized
mode of parenting."141
For neither Newbury nor Huddart JJ.A. does this
indeterminacy or counter-intuitiveness of results under the
Salmond test mean that vicarious liability for sexual assault must
necessarily be denied. Rather, it means a new form of analysis is
required-an analysis which, in the opinion of both judges, must
have more regard for the context of the sexual assault in order to
identify the significant connections between the employment role
or setting and the act or acts of sexual assault.
138

Huddart J.A. cites Sykes's efficiency-based analysis of whether vicarious
liability should arise from employee's frolics or detours (Sykes, supra note 43 at
587-88).
139 B.(P.A.) (B.C.C.A.), supra note 14 at 38.
140 Ibid see also Atiyah, supra note 7 at 262-63: in his critique of the Salmond
test,he suggests that" [i]t is only possible to treat a wilful act as an improper mode of
performing an authorised act if a very wide view indeed is taken of what the servant
is authorised to do." Atiyah further writes:

In dealing with such wilful acts there is no doubt that the
Salmond test really ceases to be of much help .... Although it is
possible to do this the exercise is largely a semantic one for, as has
already been pointed out, conduct can be correctly described at
varying levels of generality, and no one description of the 'act' on
which the servant was engaged is necessarily more correct than
any other. The attempt, therefore, to answer all questions in this
field by a blind application of the Salmond test is an
unsatisfactory one, and it would be far better if other tests could
be formulated for this purpose. (at 263).

141 B. (P.A.), supra note 14 at 32.
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According to Huddart J.A., the proper test for determining
scope of employment in cases of vicarious liability for sexual assault
must be directly informed by policy concerns. She writes: "If the
justification underpinning vicarious liability is a sufficient
connection between the employee's act and the employer's
enterprise, as I consider it is, the issue becomes one of policy to be
addressed directly rather than by hidden assumption." 142 The aim,
she thus suggests, is to develop a test which will allow the most
socially responsible result. In this, she takes guidance from Atiyah's
suggestion that "certain types of wilful acts, and in particular frauds
and thefts, are only too common, and the fact that liability is
generally imposed for torts of this kind shows that the courts are
not unmindful of considerations of policy." 143
Still, acknowledging the wisdom (and limits) of the common
law, Huddart J.A. necessarily draws upon case precedents for
guidance regarding the sufficiency of connection between the
tortious act and the employment.
a. Rejection of a "mere opportunity" test
As Huddart J.A. suggests in her analysis in B.(P.A.), 144 the imposing
of vicarious liability may be understood to require the court to
determine the necessary limits of the formula expressed by Lord
Holt in Hern v. Nichols, 145 that "it is more reasonable that he that
employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be
the loser than a stranger." That is, neither Huddart J.A. nor the rest
of the Appeal Court wish to impose a form of absolute liability
whereby an employer must in all circumstances bear the cost of an
employee's tort.
Thus both Huddart and Newbury JJ.A., along with other
members of the court, affirm the general principle from the
common law doctrine of vicarious liability that merely providing an
employee the "opportunity" to commit a tort, by setting him into
his position of employment, is not enough to incur vicarious

142 Ibid.

at 18.

143 Atiyah,

supra note 9 at 263.

144 B. (P.A.), supra note
l45 Supra note 31.

14 at 17.
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liability. 146 In Huddart J.A.'s example of Morris v. C. W Martin &
Sons, Ltd., 147 the fact that a cleaner's employee had the opportunity
to steal a fur because of his position "would not suffice," on its own,
to establish vicarious liability. This would appear to suggest that the
employer's liability should not rest on the mere fact that the
employee was, because of his or her job, at a certain place at a
certain time, and so encountered someone against whom he or she
committed a wrongful act. Further, Huddart J.A. suggests vicarious
liability does not arise where the employment role has merely
provided the opportunity for an employee to develop a relationship
of trust with his or her eventual victim. The issue then is what, apart
from the employment role's creating an opportunity for the tort,
must be established to justify a finding of vicarious liability?

b. Huddart ]A.: Conferral ofAuthority
Huddart J.A. provides the most extensive reasons of the five-judge
panel in B.(P.A.), and writes for a 3-2 majority in Griffiths. In
B. (P.A.), she proposes a test for scope of employment which bears
some similarity to the analysis of the Trial Court in McDonald as
well as that of Lowry J. at trial in B.(P.A.), yet which avoids the
Salmond test requirement that the tortious act be cast as a mode of
performing an authorised act. In her reasons, Huddart J.A.
attempts to distinguish more precisely the mere provision of
opportunity from a more significant enabling of the employee to
commit the tort. The test she proposes requires analysis of the
employer's conferral of authority upon the employee. More
specifically, this test has two parts: an analysis of the authority
conferred, and an analysis of the risks incidental to that conferred
authority:
The unique features of sexual assault cases require a
contextual approach that permits courts to examine the
nature of the authority conferred on the employee and

146 See Heuston & Buckley, text, supra note 79 at 463. In Armagas Ltd v.
Mundogas SA, at 392 [1986] 2 All E.R. 385 (H.L.), Lord Keith wrote that "[i]t is
well settled that a master is not liable for the dishonest tort of his servant merely
because the latter's employment has given him the mere opportunity to commit it."
147 [1966] l Q.B. 716, [1965] 2 All E.R. 725 at 738 (C.A.).
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the likelihood that the conferral of that authority will
increase the probability of a wrong occurring. 148

Thus it is the employer's specifically investing the employee
with such authority, as may be abused in the form of the tort that
has manifested, that gives rise to vicarious liability. While this test
seems on the surface to duplicate that suggested by Atiyah,
H uddart J .A. distinguishes her approach by emphasizing that the
analysis of authority here is not restricted to the identification of
types of authorized acts, but rather extends to analysis of positions
of authority over others, positions which in some cases may be
found to involve "the power over another that makes more probable
a wrong."149 Huddart J.A. states:
In my view, when the conferral of authority provides not
mere opportunity, but the power over another that makes
more probable a wrong, that employer should be
vicariously liable for any such wrong that results from the
abuse of that power. l50

On the issue of how such authority is set apart from mere
opportunity, Huddart J.A. addresses the suggestion of the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in McDonald that "the test is not simply
that an employee is placed in a position of trust and authority that
provides the opportunity to do wrong. Applying that test
employers would be liable for all wrongful acts of their
employees." 151 While Huddart J.A. agrees on this point, she takes
issue with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's reasoning in
McDonald for having given insufficient attention to the key issue of
"job-related authority." In constructing her own analysis on this
point, Huddart J.A. looks both to precedent (cases on fraud and
conversion, as well as workplace harassment), and policy (drawing
upon economic analysis and fiduciary theory).

148 B. (P.A.) at
149 Ibid. at

32.

24.

so Ibid.

1

151 McDonald

(N.S.C.A.), supra note 13 at 116-17.
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ii. Huddart ]A. in B. (P.A.): Precedents
a. Ostensible Authority: fraud/conversion cases

Huddart ].A. in her judgment in B. (P.A.) invokes cases involving
fraud and conversion as more appropriate precedents for assessing
vicarious liability for sexual assault than assault cases. 152 While she
accepts that the principles used in assessing employer liability in the
fraud and conversion cases may be limited in their application to
cases of sexual assault, she draws from them a general principle that
"employers can be vicariously liable for intentional employee torts
not committed in furtherance of employer objectives." 153 Moreover,
she suggests that insofar as judicial analysis in such cases gives
attention to aspects of covertness and secrecy in the commission of
these types of wrongful acts, and to the issue of the employee's
betrayal of a trust, such reasoning may be adapted to the analysis of
employee acts of sexual assault.
The cases on fraud may be taken to reflect the passage in the
Salmond test which states: "if [the servant] does fraudulently that
which he was authorised to do honestly ... his master will answer for
that ... fraud" . 154 This is interpreted through a principle of ostensible
authority, drawn from the law of agency. The Salmond and
Heuston text later defines the conditions under which this principle
applies: "Ostensible authority ... may be held to exist if, whatever
the true state of affairs, the stranger has been misled by
appearances." 155 Importantly, such appearances must bear some
relationship to the actual authority which the employer has
conferred upon the employee, even though the misleading aspect of
that authority is likely, on the employer's part, unintentional.

l5Z Lowry]. for the trial court in B.(P.A.) also accepted the plaintiff's analogy
between Curry's sexual misconduct, occuring "in the course of his carrying out his
duties during his hours of work at his employer's facilities," and cases of vicarious
liability arising from acts of theft or fraud: "if a postal clerk's theft and a solicitor's
clerk's fraud can be said to have been committed in the course of their employment,
I can see no sound principle on which it can be concluded that Curry's criminal
conduct should not attract vicarious liability" (supra note 14 at 8, Huddart JA.
quoting Lowry]. of the Trial Court).
l53 Ibid. at 16.
l54 Heuston & Buckley, supra note 79 at 443.
155 Ibid at 445.
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As Huddart J.A. discusses, there has been some controversy in
the courts and academic literature over whether the principle of
ostensible authority should be considered under the Salmond test's
first branch, regarding authorised acts-potentially, acts which have
been authorised actually, impliedly, or ostensibly 156 -or the second,
as an improper mode of performing an authorised act. But despite
indications that this principle may bear relevance most specifically
to the first branch of the Salmond test, deemed to have little
bearing upon the issue of employee sexual assault, the principle and
cases decided upon it are nonetheless deemed by Huddart J.A. to
be useful analogies.
As suggested with regard to the assault cases, at one time it was
held that an employer could not be liable for his employee's fraud
or other dishonest conduct in furtherance of personal objectives. Yet
modern fraud cases, drawing upon the principle of ostensible
authority, indicate this is not always so. The shift to an
endorsement of the ostensible authority principle is reflected in
Lloyd v. Grace Smith. 157 There, a firm of solicitors was vicariously
liable for the fraudulent misrepresentations of their clerk, who had
been entrusted with handling deeds of the sort used in the fraud.
Fleming explains the operation of the ostensible authority test
in Lloyd as best understood not in terms of a general principle that
an employer is always liable when its employee "does dishonestly
what he has been employed to do honestly," but rather that the
employer may be liable only where the employee has, or is "held
out as having," the authority to perform the act at issue. 158 Fleming
invokes Deatons v. Flew, 159 where Dixon J. held that vicarious
liability may arise from tortious acts which are "acts to which the
ostensible performance of his master's work gives occasion or which
are committed under cover of the authority the servant is held out
as possessing or of the position in which he is placed as a
representative of the master." Thus it is not the employer's
provision of mere opportunity to commit the wrong, but his
conferral of a type of actual authority which gives rise to reasonable

B.(P.A.), supra note 14 at 16.
[1912] AC. 716.
158 J.G. Fleming, supra note 7 at 384.
159 (1949) 79 C.L.R. 370 at 381.

156 See
l57
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third party perceptions of apparent authority, that grounds such a
finding of vicarious liability. 160
Courts have also imposed vicarious liability in conversion or
theft cases. While the appellant in B. (P.A.) argued this line of cases
to be limited to circumstances "where the employer authorised the
employee to take possession of property," 161 Huddart J.A. again
found a wider basis for analogizing from these cases to other
intentional torts. She invoked Morris v. Martin, 162 where an
employer was liable when its employee stole goods entrusted for
storing, because the servant had been given the authority to take
custody of the items. In this, it was again not the provision of a
mere opportunity to steal that gave rise to vicarious liability, but the
fact that the tort was committed "in the course of doing that class
of acts which the employer had put the servant in his place to
do."163
One important Canadian conversion case was The Queen v.
Levy Brothers Co. 164 There, the Supreme Court of Canada applied
Lloyd v. Grace Smith to find the Crown vicariously liable for a theft
committed by an employee or employees at a customs postal
branch. The Court determined that the employee's stealing goods
which he was authorised to handle under his statutory authority to
deal with dutiable mail was most properly regarded as an act
committed under cover of authority conferred by the Crown.
Yet it seems that, as with the second branch of the Salmond test
generally, some ambiguity may arise on the issue of how broadly to
construe the class of authorised acts, or how liberally to construe the
"cloaking" of tortious behaviour. In cases of sexual assault, it would
seem a stretch to argue that the sexual act was one which the
160 In another fraud case cited by Huddart J.A. in B.(P.A.), (supra note 14),
Armagas Ltd. v. Mundogas SA [1986] 2 All E.R. 385 (H.L.), vicarious liability was

not found. There, the employee in her fraud had undertaken responsibilities for
which the employer had not induced the belief that she had authority to undertake.
Also see George Whitechurch v. Cavanagh [1902] AC. 117); O'Riordan v. Central
Agencies Camrose Ltd (1987), 51 Alta. LR. (2d) 206, 23 C.C.L.I. 1 (Alta. C.A.); and
Kooragang Investments Pty. Ltd. v. Richardson & Wrench Ltd. [1982] AC. 462,
[1981] 3 All E.R. 65.
161 B.(P.A.), supra note 14at17.
162 Supra note 147.
163 Ibid. at 737 per Diplock].
164 [1961] S.C.R. 189, 26 D.L.R. (2d) 760.
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employee (such as a residential care worker) was apparently
authorised to perform, in the sense that the clerk's fraudulent
misrepresentation may appear to a third party to be a performance
of authorised duties. Yet Newbury ].A. in particular suggests that
such an act may be interpreted as committed under cover of
authorised duties of handling or caring for a child: "cover" here
involving in particular the trust vested in the employee in view of his
duties. Thus Newbury ].A. in her judgment in B.(P.A.) analogizes
directly from the fraud and conversion cases: "a high degree of
trust was inherent in the employee's duties such that those duties
effectively cloaked or provided a cover for the wrongdoing
complained of." 165
H uddart J.A. recognizes that the principle of ostensible
authority at work in the fraud and conversion cases is dependent on
an appearance of authority to perform an act or take possession of
property, such that a third party may perceive the wrongful act as
an execution of employment duties. Still, she derives support from
these cases for the ultimate principle she will apply to cases of sexual
assault: that where authority over vulnerable charges is conferred
upon an employee, the employee's abuse of that authority in the
form of sexual assault will give rise to vicarious liability. That is, she
derives from these cases a more general principle that vicarious
liability may arise from the employer's conferring upon the
employee authority of a type which may be abused in the form of
the tort at issue-even where that tort reflects a personal motive and
not a desired furtherance of employer objectives.
The analogy between the fraud, conversion, and sexual assault
cases is not precise. But this is acknowledged in B. (P.A.), which
draws upon this line of case law in order to derive support for
principles with which to address the circumstances particular to
sexual assault. In distinction from the cases of assault per se, where
the wrongful act committed by the employee is generally both
overt and overtly wrongful, in cases of sexual assault the employee's
abuse of authority is often committed furtively and in secret, and in
some cases, due to a gradual building of trust through the
employment relationship, the wrongfulness of the act may be
unknown to the vulnerable party until some time after the assault.
Thus despite the fact that the assault and sexual assault cases share
165 B. (P.A.),

supra note 14 at 40--41.
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the element of personal violence, the analogy may be stronger
between sexual assault, fraud, and conversion. Huddart J.A. states:
When a small child is seduced by a substitute parent into
sexual behaviour and secrecy, fraud or conversion are
more appropriate analogies than physical assault. Like
fraud and conversion, sexual assault of a child is a breach
of trust, an abuse of authority or power. I66

b. Conferred Authority: Nervous Shock/Sexual Harrassment

Huddart J.A. finds further support for the principle of conferred
authority in a few Canadian cases on employee acts of intimidation
and sexual harrassment. One of these is Boothman v. Canada, l67
where the Crown was held vicariously liable for a supervisor's
intentional infliction of nervous shock upon a subordinate
employee. This finding relied in great part on the principle that
vicarious liability may arise out of intentional employee wrongs
where "the wrong is directly attributable and connected to the duty
or responsibility conferred on the servant." 168
According to Noel J. for the Federal Trial Court, the supervisor
in Boothman had exercised his specific hiring and supervisory
powers "to inflict upon [the] plaintiff mental pain and suffering, to
harass her, intimidate her, interfere with her, and on occasion
assault her." In finding these acts to be a sufficient basis for
vicarious liability, Noel J. continued: "In my view, when an
employer places an employee in a special position of trust, he or she
bears the responsibility of ensuring that the employee is capable of
trust. That is the rationale that stands behind the vicarious liability
of an employer."169 Thus Boothman suggests, in support of the
166 Ibid

at 31.

167 [1993] 3 F.C. 381
168 Ibid at 393-94.

(T.D.).

169 Ibid. Insofar as this reasoning invokes a standard of care on the part of the
employer (to ensure the employee is capable of trust), the decision would seem to
turn upon an element of direct employer fault. That is, such reasoning is suggestive
of an analysis of the employer's duty, as opposed to the scope of the employee's
authority. Yet some confusion arises due to the fact that here, as in the Corrections
cases noted above, the Crown is the ultimate employer, and may not be found
directly liable other than for property-related or occupier's torts, but only
vicariously liable for the torts of its employees (under s. 3 of the Crown Liability
and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-38).
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position of Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.), that vicarious liability may
follow from an employee tort where the employer has, in a
significant sense, enabled the employee to commit the tort, by
placing him or her in a special position of trust or power over others.
Huddart J.A. also notes two decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada under the Canadian and Manitoba Human Rights Acts,
which contemplate the liability of employers for acts of their
employees "in the course of employment" (Canada) or "in respect
of employment" (Manitoba). 170 These are Robichaud v. Canada
(Treasury Board), 171 and Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. 172 Both
relate to the liability of an employer for the sexual harassment of
one employee by another. In both cases, the Supreme Court found
employer liability under the relevant statute, and in so doing
invoked the fact that the employee had been enabled to commit
the wrong by the authority invested in him by the employer.
Huddart J.A. suggests that in these two cases (again, not in the
context of common law vicarious liability but Human Rights Act
proceedings), the Supreme Court endorsed both the conferral of
authority test and a form of the "enterprise causation" test which
Huddart J.A. takes to be decisive in analysing scope of employment
in the context of sexual assault. Indeed, in Robichaud, La Forest J.
quoted with approval a passage from a u.s. Supreme Court
judgment which is suggestive of both the conferral of authority and
enterprise causation principles which Huddart J.A. supports: "[I]t is
the authority vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables
him to commit the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is
understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that he is
able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates." 173

iii. Huddart ]A.: Doctrine and Policy Rationales
On the one hand, Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.) looked to case
precedents on vicarious liability, or employer liability more
generally, in order to identify principles appropriate to a contextual
analysis of vicarious liability for sexual assault. But perhaps most
importantly, Huddart J.A.'s conferral of authority test relies upon a
B. (P.A.), supra note 14 at 26.
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 84.
172 [1989] l S.C.R. 1252.
l73 Quoting from Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
170
171
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conjoining of certain elements of economic and fiduciary theory.
That is, the test rests on the one hand on a principle of "enterprise
causation," based in an efficiency-oriented analysis of risk. Yet it
further requires that this principle be informed by an analysis of
employee authority, consisting particularly, it seems, in attention to
the hallmarks of fiduciary relationships. Ultimately, the test of
Huddart J.A. for scope of employment places both the analysis of
risk and that of employee authority under a wider commitment less
to efficiency than to a notion of civic responsibility to society's
most vulnerable.

a. Enterprise Causation and Civic Responsibility
In her assessment of the policy grounds for vicarious liability in
B. (P.A.), Huddart J.A. drew upon law and economics theory, and
in particular the principle that the employer may be regarded as
having assumed the costs along with the benefits of its enterprise.
As we have seen, this may be regarded both as a principle of
commutative justice premised on fairness, requiring the spreading
of costs .of an enterprise across its beneficiaries, and a cost
internalization principle, understood as serving the greater object of
efficiency and maximizing wealth.
H uddart J.A. 's analysis in B. (P.A.) is framed not in terms of
efficiency but fairness with respect to vulnerable parties, or on the
level of social policy, responsibility to those who are harmed by
power relationships instituted to serve the purposes of individual
enterprises or society at large. In this, Huddart J.A. overtly rejects
the distributive justice policy rationale of loss-spreading and
deterrence as remote from the purposes of tort law. 174 But she
endorses nonetheless a test of "enterprise causation," designed, as
we have seen with reference to Sykes, in accordance with efficiency
aims. Whether Huddart J.A. is able to realize all of her
174 Thus Huddart JA. notes (supra note 14 at 18) that, according to Weber in
"Scope of Employment' Redefined"(supra note 29), the key policy rationales for
vicarious liability are 1) the fairness of having employer bear the costs resulting
from the risks of their enterprises; 2) the efficiency of putting the onus on employers
to 'distribute costs and shift them to society' (i.e. through insurance); and 3) the
providing of an incentive "for exercising care in choosing, training, and supervising
employees." While Huddart J.A. rejects points 2 and 3 as too removed from the
purposes of tort law, she accepts the argument, also made by Sykes (supra note 43),
"that enterprises ought to be fixed with the costs of all the risks they create."
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commitments under this efficiency-based test-to fairness and
social justice, and to the objective of not forcing employers to be
insurers for employee torts-or whether she realizes a commitment
even to the enterprise causation test itself, is questionable. But her
position may at least be a defensible compromise.
As noted in Part III above, Sykes's efficiency-based analysis of
vicarious liability turns on whether the risk which materialized in
the form of the employee tort may be deemed "a cost of the
employer's business," or in other words, whether "the business is the
'cause' of the wrongs that led to the judgments." 175 In order to
decide this, Sykes suggests "a definition of causation that captures
the relationship between the existence of an employer's business and
the occurrence of a wrong by an employee." The resulting principle
is that of enterprise causation, wherein "[t]he crucial variable .. .is the
extent to which the employment relation increases the probability
of misconduct." 176
Apart from the possibility of no causal relationship between the
enterprise and employee tort, whereby the employee's lack of
employment would not affect the probability of the tort's
occurring, in Sykes's definition,
[a]n enterprise 'fully causes' the wrong of an employee if
the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent
unemployment of the employee would reduce the
probability of the wrong to zero ... [while] partial
causation [implies that] the dissolution of the enterprise
and subsequent unemployment of the employee would
reduce the probability of the wrong but not eliminate
it. 177

Both full and partial enterprise causation support vicarious
liability, as "the efficiency of resource allocation is enhanced if each
business enterprise bears the incremental social costs associated with
its operation." 178 Yet whereas liability for full causation is fully
efficient, liability for partial causation, if there is no means of
assigning only partial damages, may cause the enterprise to contract
excessively. Thus where partial damages cannot be assigned,

l76 Ibid

supra note 43 at 571.
at 572.

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid

at 573.

175 Sykes,
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liability for partial enterprise causation is a second best rule. Yet
under such circumstances, it would seem a standard of "substantial"
causation is needed, particularly where effective deterrents to the
employee tort at issue are unavailable.
In elaborating further upon the concept of enterprise causation,
Sykes cites Friendly ].'s comments on characteristic risk in Bushey,
where it is suggested that vicarious liability should arise only where
the employment creates risks "different from those attendant upon
the community in general." Thus Sykes suggests that where an
intentional tort occurs "because the existence of the enterprise
causes the employee to encounter unusual circumstances that he
would not otherwise encounter," then the business enterprise may
be deemed to have caused the tort, "even though the employee's
tortious behaviour may evince a purely personal motivation." 179 In
developing the idea of unusual employment-related circumstances,
Sykes invokes, as one of many possible examples, intrinsically
stressful occupations. Further, as Huddart ].A. argues, it would
seem that occupations that confer substantial authority or control
over others may qualify; and, it might be added, so might
occupations which grant employees special access into others'
residences or other intimate settings.
Sykes notes two California cases which found vicarious liability
for employee acts motivated by personal ill will, in which the
principle of enterprise causation is suggested. In Rodgers v. Kemper
Const. Co., 180 an employee's assault on another worker at a
construction site led to vicarious liability. In that case, there was
some suggestion that such altercations were to be expected as part
of the normal risks incidental to the business. The Court also noted
that the employee's act resulted from his perception of his rights as
an employee. In Lyon v. Carey, 181 a deliveryman's rape of a
customer on her premises was deemed within the scope of
employment, partly because of his job-related powers of access, and
partly because the rape followed a job-related dispute.
Under the enterprise causation test it seems that if it can be
shown that the tort arose during an activity that probably would
not have occurred absent the employment relationship, or the
!79

Ibid.

at

588-9.

I8o 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124
181 533 F. 2d 649 (D.C. Cir.

Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975).
1976).
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probability of the tort was otherwise substantially increased by the
employment relationship, then vicarious liability should be
assigned. Yet on this test, is Huddart J.A.'s conferral of authority
analysis in fact too restrictive? This might be suggested by the
majority finding in Griffiths, where Huddart J.A. was more
concerned than in B. (P.A.) to set down limits to the type of
authority or trust relationship that might give rise to vicarious
liability. Or does the conferral of authority analysis of Huddart J.A.
satisfy the enterprise causation test more adequately than the
analysis of Newbury J.A., in that it attempts to identify only those
circumstances of employment which may be deemed relevant to
the tort and significantly different from background conditions? In
order to gauge these issues, we must look more closely to the place
of fiduciary theory in the conferral of authority test.

b. Fiduciary Relationships and Probability of Risk
Huddart J.A. accepted the respondent's submission m B. (P.A.)
that:
The rationale for the imposition of vicarious liability on the
employer is based on the idea that the employer has deliberately
created the situation of trust for the employee. The employee
then abuses that position of trust to cause harm to an innocent
third party. As a deliberate policy choice, the Courts have
concluded that the employer should bear the risk of the loss, not
the innocent victim. 182

This was also the principle at work, though expressed in terms
of the Salmond test, in the Trial Court decision of McDonald. 183
But there, as noted above, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal later
held that the defendant diocese had merely provided the priest,
Mombourquette, with an opportunity to establish relationships with
potential victims. A key task for H uddart J .A. in B. {P.A.) then was
to distinguish liability for abuse of conferred authority more clearly
from the notion of the employer's providing the employee with the
mere opportunity to commit the wrong.
Huddart J .A. suggested that the relevant distinction may be
made by analyzing further the nature of relationships of authority
182 Supra note
183 Supra note

14 at 22-23.
13.
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or trust, and thus identifying more particularly in what instances
conferred authority over others may be deemed significant, in the
sense of the employer's significantly enabling the employee to
commit the tort. In this, Huddart J.A. suggested a certain
connection between the principle of conferred authority and the
doctrine of fiduciary duty, both being fundamentally concerned
with relationships of authority or trust. She stated: "The view of the
trial judge in [McDonaldJ can be seen as informed by the inclination
of Canadian courts to protect the vulnerable in relationships
categorized as fiduciary." 184 Moreover, Huddart ].A. asserted that
the hallmark of a fiduciary relationship, as set out by McLachlin J.
in Norberg v. Wynrib, 185 was also present in B. {P.A.): "the trust of a
person with inferior power that another person who has assumed
superior power and responsibility will exercise that power for his or
her own good and only for his or her own good and in his or her
best interests." 186
Huddart J.A. noted that Curry had discretion or power with
regard to the vulnerable minors in his care-here she referred to the
list of parental duties Curry was entrusted to perform-and he was
able to "unilaterally exercise that discretion or power so as to affect
the respondent's vital non-legal or practical interests." Further, she
found that the social bases of fiduciary duty were engaged, insofar
as "society has an interest in ensuring that the power entrusted in
caregivers of children in need of protection not be used in corrupt
ways."187
Finding that the elements of the fiduciary relationship were
satisfied was not, for Huddart J.A., an end in itself, but an
important step in assessing the vicarious liability of The Children's
Foundation. In this, Huddart J.A. linked the high level of trust
implicit in the fiduciary relationship to the further notion of
enterprise causation, or increased probability of an employee tort.
In reference to Boothman, she stated:
The conferral of power over a subordinate is qualitatively
different from the provision of opportunity. Every
employee has the opportunity to harass a colleague. Not

184 Supra note 14 at 23.
185 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, 92 D.L.R. (4th) 449.
186 Norberg, supra note 3 at 272, cited in B.(P.A.), supra note 14 at 23.
187 Supra note 14 at 23.
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all are given the authority or power that makes
harassment significantly more probable. 188

Regarding The Children's Foundation's position in B. (P.A.),
H uddart J.A. held:
Conferring upon an employee parental authority over
children, in my view, provides that employee with power
that makes more probable a wrong. This is so because the
children are placed in a position where the employee will
have complete control over every aspect of the child's life
and the child will perceive themselves to be powerless in
relation to the parental figure. l89

Thus Huddart J.A. based her finding of The Children's
Foundation's vicarious liability in its investing parental or fiduciary
authority in Curry, as well as "permitting that power to be
exercised in the absence of any other person." 190 For Huddart J.A.,
this level of authority conferred increased the probability of
misconduct beyond the ordinary risk of misconduct m a
relationship between an adult and an unrelated child.
In obiter, Huddart J.A. suggested that parental authority
constitutes the highest form of authority or trust, contrasting this
with other trust relationships: "[t]eachers, police officers, bouncers
or priests who abuse in non-residential settings do not have the
same degree of control over every aspect of a child's emotional and
physical well-being as a parental figure does. " 191 Here it is not clear
whether these other forms of authority or trust relationships would
suffice to trigger vicarious liability. For instance, while the reasoning
of the Trial Court in McDonald had appeared to be supportable
under a principle of conferred authority, here it might be
concluded that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was correct in
construing the priest's employment as merely providing the
opportunity, but not the authority, to enter into relationships of
trust with minors. Yet if Huddart J.A. is indeed requiring parental
authority and a context of residential care in order for vicarious
liability for sexual assault to arise, is she in fact adhering to a
188

Ibid

at 26.

189 Ibid at
190 Ibid at

25.

31.
191 Ibid. at 32.
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principle of enterprise causation? For it would seem that in such a
case as McDonald, despite the fact that no residential care of
children was involved, the test for substantial causation might be
met, insofar as the priest's unemployment (and the Church's
dissolution) would substantially reduce the likelihood of his
sexually abusing minors in his parish. The question remains, then,
whether it would be justified under a principle of enterprise
causation to deny vicarious liability for a priest's abuse of his
authority over those in a religious community.
In sum, Huddart J.A. suggests that the conferral of authority
principle applies particularly where an employer has set its employee
into a fiduciary relationship with others; such relationships, she
suggests, are by their very nature susceptible to abuse. Yet insofar as
the doctrine of fiduciary duty is itself an emerging area of law, this
does not put to rest questions and concerns regarding the limits to
employer liability. Even given the limits set by analysis of the
hallmarks of the fiduciary relationship, it may be that certain
instances of employee wrongs which, under an enterprise causation
analysis bear a significant connection to the employment role, could
be deemed not to give rise to vicarious liability. On the other hand,
without any limits under the conferral of authority test, employers
may effectively be made insurers for employee torts. This is a
concern raised by Newbury ].A. in putting forward her test for
scope of employment in P.A.B., while the issue of the degree of
employee authority necessary to warrant vicarious liability is further
explored in Griffiths.

iv. Newbury ]A.: Expanded Proximity Test
Newbury ].A., in her reasons in B.(P.A.), put forward a different
version of new test for scope of employment than that of H uddart
].A. In it, Newbury ].A. expressed caution regarding the conferral
of authority test, insofar as she perceived that it might "cast the net
too widely" 192 and assign liability based on abuse of a relationship
of trust where other important elements of close connection
between the employment role and the tort were absent. She
suggested that the enterprise causation standard of increased
probability of risk is an insufficient measure of close connection, as
192 Ibid. at

39.
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on this standard the mere conferring of an opportunity to commit a
wrong may be sufficient. Consequently, Newbury J.A. did not
consider in any detail the requirement under the enterprise
causation test that the risks at issue be substantially increased over
the background risks in the community, but equated this test with
one of foreseeability. Newbury J.A. stated:
[T]he conferral of authority or 'power' on a person almost
always make[s] more probable (and hence 'foreseeable') the abuse
of that power. I do not believe it is for us, in furtherance of policy
considerations, however valid, to make a radical change in the
nature of vicarious liability such that it becomes a substitute for
the law of negligence but without the necessity of proof of the
other elements thereof and without the protections given to
defendants by that law. l93

In developing this idea of the problems inherent in a conferral
of authority test which assigns liability based strictly on a notion of
increased risk, Newbury J.A. suggested that under such a test a
teacher's approaching a student in a park during summer holidays,
and subsequently abusing the child, would give rise to the school
board's vicarious liability. For the relationship of trust established in
the context of his position as teacher could be construed as
involving a foreseeable risk of abuse which had in this instance
materialized; or it might be argued under the enterprise causation
test that this relationship of trust increased the risk of abuse beyond
the background risks between unrelated adults and children in the
community at large. Yet both Newbury J.A. and Huddart J.A. seek
to avoid a test which will assign employer liability for the torts of
employees which occur, as in this example, in circumstances which
suggest the relationship has been extended beyond the environment
or the assigned duties and powers of the employment. While
Huddart J.A. meets this objective by raising the threshold by which
the employee's job-related authority may be deemed to satisfy the
test of enterprise causation, Newbury J.A. suggests that further
bases of connection between the specific tortious act and
employment context must be established to warrant employer
liability.

193 Ibid.

at 40.
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For Newbury J.A., a better way to proceed would be an
expanded form of proximity test, establishing the degree of
connectedness between the employee's duties and wrongdoing
through attention to a variety of criteria: temporal, spatial, as well as
formal (i.e. closeness of employer and employee objectives, though
this is "perhaps least useful") . 194 The specific requirements in order
to establish a connection, Newbury J .A. suggests, may be
impossible to precisely or exhaustively define, but much like the
concepts of proximity and duty of care in negligence, must be
gauged according to the facts of each case. Thus while H uddart
J .A. suggests that the sole or primary concern in assessing vicarious
liability for sexual assault is the degree and type of authority
conferred on the employee, Newbury J .A. suggests that while the
issue of authority is important (indeed, she bases her finding in
B. (P.A.) particularly on the "high degree of trust" inherent in
Curry's duties), 195 the test for scope of employment must
additionaly consider the nexus of all the other elements which she
has suggested may imply a sufficient connection between the
employment and tort.
Here it might be suggested that the test of Newbury J.A., with
its emphasis on a broad contextual analysis of the act of sexual
assault and its relationship to the employment environment, might
be more rather than less adequate to the principle of enterprise
causation than the test of Huddart J.A.. That is, the test as Sykes
sets it out might well require examination of more than the degree
of the employee's authority. Rather, a constellation of related
factors might suggest that the enterprise has increased the
probability of the tort in fostering an environment of risk which
was, though not as such constitutive of negligence liability,
nonetheless conducive to employee acts of sexual assault. For
instance, while Huddart J.A. mentions in B. (P.A.), with some
suggestion of significance, the fact that Curry was able to commit
his assaults in the plaintiff's room in the absence of any other
employee, such a circumstance could be brought more directly to
bear on the issue of scope of employment in the test of Newbury
J.A .. That is, even where Huddart J.A.'s requirement of total
intervention or fiduciary authority is not met, the test of Newbury
l94 Ibid.
l95 Ibid. at

40-41.
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J .A. might still assign key significance to such a circumstance as
employment-related access to the plaintiff in intimate quarters,
through analysis of spatial or functional connections between the
the circumstances of the tort and employment duties. Still, whereas
the emphasis in Huddart J.A.'s conferral of authority test is
causation, or increased probability of risk, the emphasis in Newbury
J.A.'s test remains one of identification or likeness between the tort
and the employment, though it lacks the Salmond test's
requirement of identifying the tort as a mode of performing an
authorised act.
In the more brief reasons of Finch J.A., the conferral of
authority principle seems to be reduced to the more traditional
issue of foreseeability, with the accompanying implication of
employer fault. This, Finch J.A. suggests, may be a useful way to
approach the issue of vicarious liability, as the question of which of
two "innocents" should bear a loss might then be resolved by "the
fact that one may be seen as slightly less innocent than the other." 1%
This suggestion invokes the deep tension between the principles of
direct and indirect fault underlying vicarious liability doctrine. But
it would seem that where direct fault is at issue, this should be
addressed separately and on its own terms. This is what Newbury
J .A. strongly suggests, arguing that if B. (P.A.) had not come to the
court as a vicarious liability issue, it would have been most
appropriate to address the liability of The Children's Foundation in
terms of its proper duty to the children in its care.
Both Finch and Hollinrake JJ .A. suggest in B. (P.A.) that the
tests of Huddart and Newbury JJ.A. may be reconciled. Hollinrake
J.A. suggests that the analysis of conferred authority might, in cases
of sexual assault, be principally relied upon in determining whether
there is "sufficient nexus between the duties of the employee as
such and his misconduct." 197 Yet such an approach seems not to
achieve the effective fulfilment of both tests, in that the two tests
continue to suggest differing degrees of emphasis upon conferred
authority, and upon other circumstances indicative of the requisite
nexus. In Griffiths, the potential for the tests to come into overt
conflict is more evident.

!% Ibid. at
197 I bid. at

43.
41.
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v. Application of the Two New Tests in Griffiths

In Griffiths, the differing implications of the two new tests for scope
of employment developed in B. (P.A.) are further explored. In
particular, Huddart J.A.'s conferral of authority test (here, the test
of the majority) is shown to set a high threshold for employee
authority under the standard of enterprise causation. Moreover,
despite Newbury J.A.'s concerns in B. (P.A.) that the conferral of
authority test casts its net too widely, here her test admits employer
liability in one instance where the majority's test would not.
According to Huddart J.A., the employee Griffiths, as Program
Director of the Boys' and Girls' Club, did not possess such jobcreated authority as might render his employer liable for his abusive
conduct. In this, Huddart J.A. applied her test from B. (P.A.),
requiring the court to "examine the nature of the power conferred
on the employee and the likelihood that the conferral of that power
will increase the probability of a wrong occurring." 198 She found no
evidence that the powers bestowed upon Griffiths by the Club
satisfied the latter part of this test. Importantly, this analysis rested
particularly on the fact that the Club itself had no powers or
authority over children: "It was not their parent. Nor did it stand in
loco parentis." 199 Thus while the Club encouraged Griffiths to form
friendships with the children who opted to attend Club activities,
no formal authority over the children flowed from Griffith's
employment role.
Here, Huddart J.A. attempted to distinguish employee
positions which require the exercise of common law or statutory
authority, and/or which involve duties akin to parental authority,
from those positions which involve only the inherent potential for
the development of relationships of trust in the course of job related
duties. Therefore, despite the fact that one of the plaintiffs in
Griffiths had viewed Griffiths as "god-like," the position of trust
which he occupied was deemed not to flow from the employer's
conferral of authority, but merely from his taking the opportunity
provided by his role to develop relationships with the children he
later abused.
Again, we may ask whether this is a defensible analysis under
the enterprise causation test. Huddart J.A. suggested that there was
198 Ibid.
199

at 18.
Griffiths, supra note 15 at 209.
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nothing in Griffiths' employment which increased the probability
of a wrong "beyond the risk ordinarily occurring in our community
when adults and children come together to participate in common
activities." 200 Yet might the fact that the Boys' and Girls' Club
coordinated and structured such activites, and set its employee in a
position of at least informal authority over children in the context
of those activities, indicate a potentially significant increased
probability of risk? Further, would such a denial of vicarious
liability as that applied under the conferred authority test in
Griffiths, in light of the employee's lack of parental authority, also
apply to a diocese and its priest? Again one might consider the
position of the priest Mombourquette in McDonald and his "godlike" status in the social and cultural milieu of devotees. In such a
context, it might be argued that a priest is invested by the Church
with more authority than is passed to a Boys' and Girls' Club
director, perhaps satisfying Huddart J.A.'s test despite the lack of
any formal parental authority. But it is not dear that such an
argument would succeed in showing a significant form of conferred
authority, at least where that authority is exercised outside a
residential setting.
As to the test of Newbury J.A., in Griffiths the potential for an
expansion of employer liability under this test, beyond that
imposed under the test of Huddart J.A., is suggested. Again, while
the test of Huddart J.A. functioned to deny liability for all the
incidents of Griffiths' sexual misconduct, Newbury J.A.'s test
would have assigned vicarious liability to the Club for the one
incident occurring in the course of Club-related activities (the bus
trip). It is apparent in Griffiths then that where misconduct in the
course of performing duties is shown, Newbury J.A.'s more flexible
analysis encompassing not only the type or degree of authority, but
also other points of connection between the employee's authorised
duties and the tortious acts, may allow employer liability despite a
lack of significant job-related authority.
Does Newbury J.A.'s test cast its nets too widely? Or, does such
a test allow too much flexibility of analysis? On its face, this test
may assign liability where the only connection between the
employment and tort is spatial or temporal. At the other extreme,
Newbury J.A. suggests in her brief account of relevant factors that a
200 Ibid. at

210.
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formal connection showing the identity of employer and employee
objectives may in some instances be required. But in what instances?
Newbury J.A. has indicated that as in findings of proximity and
duty of care, a judgment is required in making such assessments for
which no formulaic test may be devised; each case demands its own
contextual analysis. Yet this gives little guidance on the specific
requirements for analysis of vicarious liability for sexual assault.
Again, such a position might be most reconcilable with the
"enterprise causation" principle, insofar as it admits of a variety of
criteria establishing the employment as significantly increasing the
probability of risk.
In Huddart J.A.'s analysis, it is primarily and perhaps solely the
nature and extent of the employee's authority, and risks consequent
to it, that is relevant in connecting the employment role to the act
of sexual assault. But in light of Griffiths, it might further be asked:
what of cases involving special employee access, for example sexual
assaults committed by apartment superintendents or deliverymen?
While such cases may give rise to employer liability under the test
of Newbury J.A., in its regard for a spatial and temporal nexus
between the employment and the tort, could such a power of access
be sufficient to give rise to employer liability under Huddart J.A.'s
test, despite there being no wide ranging parental or other authority
over those who reside in the places to which employment-related
access may be granted? Again, Huddart J.A. might direct attention
to the hallmarks of the fiduciary relationship-and perhaps the
analysis of the two types of cases here mentioned would differ,
insofar as the superintendent may unilaterally exercise his powers of
access, while the deliveryman is one whom recipients of deliveries
may or may not admit. But it is not dear that Huddart J.A.'s
conferral of authority test, with its emphasis on parental authority,
would be satisfied in either case.
Before turning to some final questions regarding the
justifiability and proper scope of vicarious liability for sexual assault,
a few further cases on point may be useful to deliberations on the
proper scope of any new scope of employment test.

3. Vicarious Liability for Sexual Assault and the Principle of
Conferred Authority: Further Caselaw
Apart from B.(P.A.),Grijfiths, and McDonald at trial and B.(P.A.) at
the B.C. Court of Appeal, certain other Canadian cases have
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invoked the notion of conferred authority in imposing vicarious
liability for an employee's sexual assault. These include K (W.) v.
Pornbachefl.01 and A.(C.) v. Critchley. 202
Pornbacher was a B.C. Supreme Court judgment rendered
before B. {P.A.) and Griffiths reached the B.C. Court of Appeal. In
it, a finding of negligence as well as vicarious liability was made
against the Bishop of Nelson, Corporation Sole, for sexual assaults
committed by a priest upon a student at a Catholic school in 1975.
The defendants had raised the argument that the priest did not
have duties specifically involving children, and further, that because
the sexual acts were contrary to his vow of celibacy, they could not
be deemed within the scope of his employment. Yet Quijano J., in
rejecting the reasoning of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in
McDonald and following that of the B.C. Supreme Court in
B. {P.A.), suggested that the McDonald judgment had not
considered "the question of vicarious liability in the context of the
role of the church and its clergy in relation to its congregation,
especially children. "203 In this decision, Quijano J. proposed that the
inquiry into vicarious liability in that case had to examine whether,
in practice, the defendant priest "was to be involved in the care or
nurturing of children in the course of his employment. "204 This was
found to be so. Notably, though, much of the analysis centred
upon the direct liability-based notion of the defendants' (both the
priest's and diocese's) duty-emphasizing that where a person or
201

(1997), 32 B.C.L.R. (3d) 360 (S.C.).
[1997] B.C.J. No. 1020 (Q.L.) (S.C.). Also of note is the case JB. v. Jacob
[1997] N.B.J. No. 351 (QL.) (QB.). There, a male nurse's sexual touching of a
sleeping male patient was deemed to bear no relationship to the nurse's duties; thus
the hospital's vicarious liability was rejected. While Creaghan J. found no vicarious
liability, he did acknowledge the potential for such a finding if a closer nexus with
authorised employment acts were established. Thus he stated:
202

I am also of the view that the second branch of the Salmond test is
sufficiently flexible to permit a reasoned application of vicarious
liability even in cases of sexual assault. An employer is responsible
not merely for what he authorizes his employee to do but also for
the way in which he does it. In the context of the case before me,
should a nurse sexually assault a patient in the course of
performing his duties as a nurse, then the argument remains open
that the employer could be held vicariously liable.
203 Supra note 201
204 Jbid at 380.

at 378.
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institution is placed in authority over children, it has a high duty of
care-rather than vicarious liability principles as such.
A. (C) v. Critchley is another B.C. Supreme Court case on
vicarious liability for sexual assault, decided after the B.C. Court of
Appeal decisions in B. (P.A.) and Griffiths. There, the four plaintiffs
had been wards of the Superintendent of Child Welfare of B.C.
and placed at a community-based facility run by Critchley (a foster
parent). Along with its finding that Critchley had sexually abused
the minors, the court held the Crown vicariously liable under the
headings of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and vicarious
liability.
One key issue in Critchley was whether the actions of a foster
parent, not as such a Crown employee, may give rise to vicarious
liability. Allan J. concluded, with reference both to an
"organization" and "control" test: that the relationship between the
Superintendent of Child Welfare and Critchley was one which
would admit of vicarious liability. 205 Further, Allan ]. reviewed the
decisions in B. (P.A.) and Griffiths, for the principle that vicarious
liability may be justified even for criminal conduct where the court
is able to identify "the employer's conferral on an employee of the
very authority that the employee abused. "206 On such a test, and in
light of the fact that here, as in B. (P.A.), the assailant had parental
authority and a wide scope of intervention in all areas of the youths'
lives, Allan ]. concluded that the Crown was vicariously liable for
Critchley's acts of sexual assault.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that notable among the u.s. cases
invoked by Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.)-particularly in its tempering
the suggestion that only parental authority may support vicarious
liability for sexual assault-is Mary M v. City of Los Angeles. 207
There, the California Supreme Court invoked the principle of
conferred authority to hold the City vicariously liable for the acts
of a police officer who, after pulling over the plaintiff for drinking
and driving, took her to her house and sexually assaulted her. 208
205 Critchley,

supra note 202 at paras. 216-30.
at para. 241.
207 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991).
208 The California Supreme Court distinguished Mary M in Lisa M v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995) (discussed in B.(P.A.),
supra note 14 at 30-31). There, a hospital was not vicariously liable for the sexual
assault of a patient by an ultrasound technician. Though the technician had used the
206 Ibid.
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Apart from Mary M., the majority of the u.s. cases cited by
H uddart
J.A-involving teachers, priests, and health
professionals-go toward the denial of employer liability for sexual
assault. But there are a growing number of such cases in which
vicarious liability has been found. 209 The principles applied have
varied widely across the different u.s. jurisdictions, with some
courts (and some states) still attending to the "motivation to serve"
test or the foreseeability test in order to deny liability for shocking
or outrageous conduct, and others assigning liability on principles
akin to Mary M. In the cases assigning employer liability,
considerations of policy have been at the forefront, most
particularly a commitment to the distributive justice goals of
deterrence and risk and loss-spreading, as well as the notion of the
equitable assignment of benefits and losses.
V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT:
FINAL ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

We have seen that in B. (P.A.) and Griffiths, the B.C. Court of
Appeal has made an important departure from the traditional
Salmond test for scope of employment in order to address the issue
of vicarious liability for sexual assault. The reasons of both H uddart
and Newbury JI.A. in B. (P.A.) set out compelling critiques of rigid
adherence to the Salmond test, particularly in cases involving
intentional torts. But in detaching the analysis from the Salmond
test's classification of the tortious act as a mode of performing
authorised acts, the challenge has been to construct a new test which
cover of the examination procedure to assault the plaintiff, it was held that the test
required that the tort be engendered by the work, or that the work predictably
create the risk that such torts would be committed. That the job involved physical
contact was not a close enough connection. This employee's abuse of a position of
trust was deemed to differ significantly from a police officer's abuse of his
authority, where the latter could be analyzed specifically in terms of the unique
legal and coercive nature of that authority.
209 See Weber supra note 29, for a comprehensive review of the American case
law on vicarious liability for sexual assault. In particular, at 1520-22 footnote 33,
she surveys the cases denying employer liability because of the personal nature of
sexual assaults; footnote 34 surveys cases focusing on foreseeability and 'shocking' or
'outrageous' conduct; and footnote 35 reviews the more recent lines of cases
focussing on the issue of job-related authority.
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does justice both to victims of sexual assault and to employers.
Thus Huddart and Newbury JJ.A. have formulated tests seeking to
invite a contextual analysis of the specific circumstances linking
sexual assaults to particular employment roles. Both have suggested
that an important measure of the adequacy of any new test is its
ability to address both the secrecy and the aspect of betrayal of
trust inherent in many job-related sexual assaults. And yet, both
suggest that such a test must avoid making employers liable for all
employee acts of sexual assault, no matter how tenuous the
connection to the employment role.
Apart from the issues raised in Part IV above regarding the
limits of employer liability under the two new tests suggested by
the B.C. Court of Appeal, some final questions may now be raised
with respect to the justificatory bases of these tests. Following this,
a proposal will be made regarding defensible limits to a scope of
employment test in the context of sexual assault, which seeks to
address some of the differing concerns raised by H uddart and
Newbury JJ.A. In closing, some consideration will be given to
whether alternative forms of analysis of employer responsibility or
liability for employee acts of sexual assault might be more
adequate, either to concerns of fairness generally or to a feminist
concern to identify and transform the social determinants of sexual
assault or abuse.

1. Justifications of Vicarious Liability for Sexual Assault:
Reconsidered
As noted above, in her assessment of the justificatory bases of
vicarious liability for sexual assault, Huddart J.A. overtly rejects the
distributive justice based reasons of deterrence and loss and riskspreading, deeming these to be at odds with the purposes of tort
law. 210 In this, she indicates an adherence to the corrective justice
approach, citing Weinrib, who argues that tort law is concerned
with redressing tortious wrongs, and not with spreading or
deterring losses which arise from injuries generally. Yet it would
nonetheless seem that the justificatory principle, which is most
significant in the reasons of Huddart J.A., is based not in the
210 B.(P.A.),

supra note 14 at 19.
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corrective justice orientation to fault-an orientation which, we
have seen, is elaborated in vicarious liability as a concern to derive a
form of composite identity between the employer and employee
with respect to the tortious act-but upon the fairness of assigning
responsibility for the costs of enterprise or institutional activities to
those who benefit from those activities. This is essentially the
principle of commutative justice. Notably, this principle, along with
the enterprise causation test which Huddart J.A. adopts (with its
origins in the economic principle of cost internalization), manifests
in B. (P.A.) as a hybrid of efficiency and fairness concerns.
Under the corrective justice analysis, we have seen that in order
to ground the fiction of the employer-acting-through-the-employee
the principle of enterprise causation or responsibility for
characteristic risks might arguably stand in place of the Salmond
test's emphasis on identity of acts, or on classifying the tortious act
as a mode of performing a wider class of authorised acts. Yet it
might also be argued that in light of the corrective justice model's
primary concern for fault, the difficulty with the Salmond test,
which the B.C. Court of Appeal has encountered, is not solved by
altering the test to more easily admit employer liability for sexual
assault; rather, it might be protested that the intentional tort of
sexual assault simply does not support vicarious liability. Such a
position might rest on the assertion that the employee's act of
sexual assault is, in its physical as well as moral aspects, qualitatively
or categorically different from the employer's enterprise activities.
Yet such a position runs up against the arguments regarding the
determination of categorically identical or different acts as based in
mere semantics, as well as the case precedents on fraud and
conversion, where employees have similarly acted against common
mores as well as against the law, yet vicarious liability has been
assigned. While the agency-based principle of ostensible authority
might be invoked to support a distinction between those cases and
cases involving sexual assault, still the distinction is a fine one, and
one difficult to maintain in the courts, as it effectively suggests that
employer liability may arise out of an employee's theft of a coat
which was entrusted to him in the course of duties, but not for an
employee's sexual assault of a child or other vulnerable party so
entrusted. Thus while the corrective justice emphasis upon an
extension of fault to the employer may lead to a second guessing of
the application of vicarious liability to intentional torts which depart
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in a shocking or extreme manner from the duties assigned, the issue
is taken in B. (P.A.) to turn instead upon a notion of fairness
involving an analysis of characteristic risks, and an ensuing
alignment of enterprise benefits and harms, rather than on the
classification or identification of authorised and tortious acts.
Turning to distributive justice, while Huddart J.A. in B. (P.A.)
expressly rejects the standard efficiency-based rationales for
vicarious liability, other cases have suggested that the justification
for assigning such liability in cases of sexual assault is that the
employer, and not the employee, is the least-cost insurer and most
effective taker of preventive measures. Indeed, in Griffiths at trial,
Wilkinson J. appealed to these notions, while simultaneously
invoking the fault-based notions of the special duty or standard of
care to which institutions charged with the care of children must be
held, yet recognized the difficulty of establishing employer
negligence where an employee has commited sexual assault:
Institutions engaged in the care of children are able to protect
themselves with insurance and, more importantly, are in a better
position than the children to prevent sexual misconduct. If the
scourge of sexual predation is to be stamped out, or at least
controlled, there must be powerful motivation acting upon those
who control institutions engaged in the care, protection and
nurturing of children. That motivation will not in my view be
sufficiently supplied by the likelihood of liability in negligence.
In many cases evidence will be lacking or have long since
disappeared. The proof of appropriate standards is a difficult and
uneven matter. 211

The tension expressed here between principles of fault and of
vicarious liability is reflected in the reasons of Huddart J.A in
B.(P.A.). Despite her express rejection of the deterrence rationale,
in certain passages Huddart J.A. appears to endorse just this
rationale as of key importance to her findings. She states:
It is implicit in this approach [the conferral of authority
test] that the imposition of vicarious liability on those
who undertake the protection of neglected and abused
children is necessary to control the abuse of job-created
authority. This need justifies the strict liability of an

211

Griffiths (B.C.S.C.), supra note 15 at para. 69.
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employer, whether its imposition is seen as a return to
first principles or an extension of existing principles. 212
In another passage, as part of an argument in defense of the
application of the cost internalization approach to institutions
charged with the care of children, Huddart ].A. holds: "[i]f the risk
of misconduct is reduced by the imposition of vicarious liability,
then the total social cost is reduced. Reduction in the total social
cost of a necessary enterprise can be seen as the root of the cost
internalization argument. "213
In these passages, it is suggested that findings of vicarious
liability may function as an incentive for employers to institute
preventive measures and so reduce incidents of employee
misconduct. Yet this suggestion seems to overlook Huddart J.A.'s
own earlier remark in B.(P.A.) that "[v]icarious liability may cause
employers to overcorrect by exercising undue care. A rule that
makes employers liable only where employee torts are caused or
facilitated by employer negligence would suffice to create an
incentive for care." 214 It might be asked whether it is possible to
overcorrect or take undue care where the protection of children and
other vulnerable charges is at issue. The answer would seem to be
yes, at least under the cost internalization argument, whereby
overcorrection will result in a contraction of services. Thus H uddart
J .A.' s apparent reliance on the deterrence argument in imposing
vicarious liability seems misplaced.
On the other hand, Huddart J.A.'s point may be that the
argument on deterrence is in these circumstances in need of
supplementation by a further and more fundamental argument
regarding the application of principles of cost-internalization to
essential social services, or to institutions-generally either
government or non-profit charitable organizations-charged with
the care and protection of children. Indeed, it must be kept in
mind that the new scope of employment tests put forward in
B. (P.A.) and Griffiths are most specifically aimed at organizations
which confer parental authority on employees. On the one hand,
212 B. (P.A.), supra
21 3 Ibid at 21.

note 14 at 32.

21 4 Ibid at 19. Further, as noted above in the discussion of Sykes's efficiency
analysis, the employer's actual means of deterrence-persuasion, coercion, or
surveillance- with regard to employee acts of sexual assault may be limited.
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Huddart J.A. acknowledges that cost internalization principles do
not hold in all respects outside the context of free market
enterprises. Thus while these principles operate on assumptions of
enterprise expansion or contraction in accordance with the total cost
of providing a good or service, this is not true of necessary public
services, such as teaching, policing, and providing care and
protection to children in need. Huddart J.A. affirms: "A
community's moral obligation to children cannot be ignored." 21 5
But she nonetheless draws from the cost internalization argument a
principle which may be imported into her analysis of the vicarious
liability of government and charitable institutions: "that the
increased costs arising from the conferral of authority must be
borne by someone. "216
In this though, particular issues regarding the economic effects
of imposing vicarious liability upon government and upon private
charities should be noted. On the one hand, government is both a
monopolist with respect to the assumption of parental authority
outside the family setting (though it can delegate this authority),
and a self-insurer, such that the costs of liability are meted out to
taxpayers and/or reflected in reduced services. 21 7 As such, while the
point should not be overstated (particularly with regard to legal
responsibilities to the most vulnerable members of society), the
government's ability to cover liability costs is not limitless,
constrained by budgetary concerns and by the threat of taxpayer
revolt and loss of office. In this respect it is notable that the
potential financial impact of an employer liability rule for sexual
assault by government employees charged with the care of
children-and further, following Critchley, also for the sexual
misconduct of foster parents-promises to be not inconsiderable.
On the other hand, private charitable organizations would
generally require private insurance in order to cover the costs of
vicarious liability. Here, a further consideration may be raised with
particular relevance to the commutative justice model. Again, 1t 1s
this model, with its emphasis upon the alignment of benefits and
21 5 Ibid

at 20.

216 Ibid.
21 7 See the discussion of the economic effects of government liability (here, in the
context ofliability for economic loss), in David Cohen, "Government Liability for
Economic Losses: the Case of Regulatory Failure", (1992) 20 Can. Bus. L. J. 215.
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harms where enterprises or institutions impose systemic risks upon
individuals in undertaking large-scale activities, which appears to be
of most significance to the B.C. Court of Appeal in B. (P.A.). Susan
Vella has posited this form of justification for vicarious liability for
employee acts of sexual assault:
[W]here an institution seeks to derive the benefits of
fostering a relationship or culture based on trust or
power, it must assume the companion responsibilities
which arise when that relationship or position is abused
by an individual actor which it placed there in the first
place. 218

In Keating's analysis of liability under the model of
commutative justice, the institution of insurance, understood as the
means of connecting the costs of employee torts to an enterprise's
characteristic risks, is vital. Indeed, Keating argues that the
institution of insurance affects the enterprise's moral responsibility
with regard to injuries arising from characteristic risks (here,
expressed in terms not of intentional torts but accidental harms):
[T]he institution of insurance affects the extent of
injurer's moral responsibility for the harms that they
accidentally inflict. Morally oriented tort theorists have
long assumed that, if responsibility for accidental harm
must be predicated on what people do, not on who they
are, the institution of liability insurance must be
essentially irrelevant to responsibility for accidental
injury. Just as this principle should forbid holding people
responsible for harm simply because their pockets are
deep enough to pay for it, so too it should forbid
holding them responsible just because they have enough
insurance to cover it.... [T]hat conviction is too
sweeping. Whether or not it is fair to leave the financial
costs of non-negligent accidents concentrated on a few
unlucky victims depends greatly on whether the costs of
those accidents can be distributed across those who
benefit by creating the risks that harm those unlucky few.
The institution of insurance is intimately involved in
answering that question. 21 9

218Vella,

supra note 92 at 13.
supra note 35 at 1338.

21 9 Keating,
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Thus in Keating' s theory of enterprise liability as premised upon
commutative justice, the analysis must focus both upon the
justifiability of framing a particular wrong as a characteristic risk of
the enterprise, and then further on, whether such a risk is systematic
and common enough to give rise to a homogeneous risk pool for
insurance purposes, such that the loss may be spread across those
who impose and presumably benefit from imposing the risk. If the
latter condition is not met, and the loss cannot be spread across
those who benefit, then it seems vicarious liability may not be
justified.
A question arises as to how this reasoning might pertain to an
enterprise's or employer's moral and legal responsibility for an
employee's act of sexual assault. In this regard, it is notable that
insurance coverage may in such circumstances be a problem for
employers. This is not to suggest that it would be impossible to
establish a working system of liability insurance for employee acts
of sexual assault. As such, any further questions of specific coverage
may be irrelevant under Keating's commutative justice analysis. But
still, even apart from the issue of whether charitable organizations in
particular have the funds to purchase liability insurance, it seems
more attention might be given under a fairness analysis to the
relevance of the general practice of insurance companies to exclude
(or seek to exclude) coverage for "bodily injury, sickness or
disease," as well as for intentional harm under comprehensive
general liability policies. 220

220

See, for instance, Wellington Guarantee v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in
Canada (1996), 35 C.C.L.I. (2d) 164 (B.C.C.A.). There, the plaintiffs alleged that
psychological injuries had followed upon sexual assaults by their adoptive father (an
employee of the Church). Coverage under the Church's Comprehensive General
Liability policy was denied, under an exclusion clause as to "bodily injury, sickness
or disease". See also Victoria General Hospital v. General Accident Assurance Co. of
Canada (1995), 32 C.C.L.I. (2d) 243 (Man. QB.), where it was found that one of
the hospital's insurers was not obligated to cover damages for a patient's "severe
emotional trauma" following from alleged sexual abuse by a guidance counsellor.
The policy in question excluded coverage for "bodily injury'', including "mental
anguish, injury, shock, humiliation, disease or disability." Regarding denial of
coverage to perpetrators of sexual assault (as well as, in this case, to a third party who
had failed in her duty to protect the victim) under the exclusion of coverage for
intentional harm by the insured, see Wilkieson-Valiente v. Wilkieson, [1996] I.LR.
1-3551 (Ont. Ct., General Div.).
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Such concerns regarding insurance might be invoked to argue
that the principle of commutative justice or of spreading enterprise
losses across the beneficiaries of enterprise activities is inapplicable,
or at least restricted in application, in cases of employee sexual
assault. Yet here we must return to the emphasis placed by Huddart
J.A. upon the notion of the responsibility of institutions premised
upon the establishment of relationships of trust or authority to bear
the costs of abuses of that authority. Such a responsibility, she
suggests, applies as much to government or charitable organizations
as to private enterprise. And where charitable organizations or
organizations to whom government has delegated responsibility
cannot cover the costs of abuse of such authority, Huddart J.A.' s
reasoning implies, they are unsuitable in their role, in forcing the
children in need of protection "to bear the costs of injuries done
them by persons in whose control they are placed. " 221 In such
circumstances, it would seem, the services at issue should be
undertaken directly by government-that is, by the community at
large, which is under a moral obligation to provide services to
children in need of care and protection. Thus Huddart J.A.' s
analysis rests not so much on a principle of economic efficiency as
one of civic obligation, whereby she suggests that as there is a civic
responsibility to protect neglected and abused children, and as the
assumption and conferral of parental authority by the state is
necessary to that obligation, the accompanying risk and cost of
abuse "is simply part of the price to be paid by the community to
obtain the service it needs .... If the community does not bear the
cost," Huddart J.A. notes, "the innocent victim must." 222

2. Conclusions/Alternative Bases of Liability
The fairness-based approach to vicarious liability for sexual assault
put forward in B. {P.A.) and examined here is an approach
grounded in the principle of commutative justice and in the specific
assessment of enterprise causation-combined with, at least in
Huddart J.A.'s conferral of authority test, a considerable dose of
fiduciary theoty. While any attempt to draw a definite conclusion
from the many propositions and problems raised by the B.C. Court
of Appeal in B. (P.A.) and Griffiths risks oversimplification, this will
221 B. (P.A.), supra
222 Jbid at 21.

note 14 at 33.
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soon be the task of the Supreme Court, and so it may be useful here
to offer up some possibilities. To start, I would suggest that the
critiques raised in these cases regarding the Salmond test's
inadequacy in assessing vicarious liability for sexual assault should
be affirmed. The B.C. Court of Appeal, and in particular Huddart
and Newbury JJ.A., have identified as that test's fundamental flaw
its reliance upon semantics over any clear principle, a feature which
may in negligence cases have allowed courts flexibility in making
policy-based decisions, but which offers no similar flexibility in
cases of sexual assault. Instead, I would argue, following the
suggestions of Huddart J.A., the principle of enterprise causation or
characteristic risks more adequately describes a form of dose
association between the employment and the employee tort which
bears relevance to employer liability.
Yet as we have seen, questions remain with regard to the proper
limits of vicarious liability for sexual assault under a new scope of
employment test, particularly in light of the differing analyses of
Huddart and Newbmy J].A. In this respect, I would suggest that an
attempt be made to incorporate some of the more pressing
concerns of both judges regarding the proper limits and scope of
employer liability in such cases, without merely leaving the test
open to judicial discretion in analyzing conferred authority along
with any of a number of other factors. One possibility would be to
extend liability under the test beyond Huddart J.A.'s threshold of
conferred fiduciary authority (at some points in her reasoning,
seemingly requiring the higher threshold of all-encompassing
parental authority), to more explicitly admit forms of fiduciary
authority beyond that of parental status, where contextual analysis
establishes that the fiduciary's authority functioned to significantly
increase the likelihood of sexual assault beyond background risks.
Further, the test may be expanded to admit employer liability in
instances where the employer has conferred to the employee
extraordinary priviledges of access to domestic or other intimate
settings.
Thus some element of the spatial and temporal nexus proposed
by Newbury J.A. might inform the new test, so as to identify
employer liability for employee abuses not only of positions
involving a high degree of authority over others (understood
through what is essentially a duplication of the analysis of fiduciary
duty), but also positions of trust which involve unusual access to
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others in private domains. Further, access to intimate areas of the
body-even in the absence of formal authority over others-might
be deemed to give rise to significantly increased risks of sexual
assault over background risks. Such a test might call into question
the appropriateness of Newbury J.A.'s finding of liability for the
sexual misconduct of the Program Director on the bus trip in
Griffiths (arguably fulfilling neither the requirement for fiduciary
authority nor that of an extraordinary privilege of access to the
child in an intimate setting). On the other hand, the u.s. case of
Lisa M v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 223 where a
hospital was found not to be vicariously liable on scope of
employment arguments after a patient was sexually assaulted by an
ultrasound technician (who arguably had been conferred an
extraordinary privilege of access to the patient, both in terms of
spatial seclusion and physical intimacy), may be taken as an
example where vicarious liability should have been imposed.
Still, these suggestions are not made without some deep
reservations. We have seen, apart from concerns regarding the
proper limits of a new scope of employment test which would
admit of vicarious liability for sexual assault, further concerns which
reflect a corrective justice based regard for fault, and accompanying
perception of injustice (along with, according to the Weinrib
critique, suggestions of incoherence or of foregoing the principled
limits of tort law) in assigning liability based solely in a standard of
increased probability of risk. Such concerns may focus in particular
on the fact that the characteristic risks at issue in cases of employee
acts of sexual assault involve the decisions and criminal actions of an
independent moral agent. Moreover, we have noted with reference
to the commutative justice model that practical concerns regarding
insurance may in some instances call the fairness of vicarious
liability into question.
In view of these concerns, there is a strong argument that the
analysis of direct employer liability, or duty, is the preferable means
of proceeding in such cases. That is, it may be argued that the
proper limits upon and extention of employer liability for employee
sexual assault is more adequately addressed not through attention
to the employee's proper role but to the employer's proper duty,
posed either under an analysis of the standard of care in negligence,
223

Supra note 208.
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or in terms of a fiduciary or statute-based non-delegable duty
(which could not be foregone through conferral of authority). Such
an analysis might satisfy the policy as well as fairness concerns
raised in B. (P.A.), potentially assigning liability to those employers
or enterprises which possess such parental or other significant
authority over vulnerable parties as may be conferred onto
employees, while setting the limits of employer liability more
clearly than the emerging scope of employment or characteristic
risks test.
This is suggested by Newbury J.A. in B.(P.A.), 224 in prefacing
her new approach to the scope of employment by indicating that a
less circuitous route to establishing employer liability may have
been to assess The Children's Foundation's position in terms of a
statutorily-derived non-delegable or fiduciary duty. 225 As such, a
strict standard of adherence to the vulnerable party's best interests,
and a duty which could not be shed by the conferring of power
upon an employee, may have been established. Freya Kristjanson, in
a recent paper, 226 suggests too that justice may be better served in
cases involving employee acts of sexual assault by reorienting the
focus once again from the criteria for establishing vicarious liability
to the criteria for direct liability or fault. In this, she urges lawyers
and judges to work toward a more scrupulous and sensitive
approach to the standard of care in negligence, informed by
feminist analysis and thereby cognizant of the power relationships
and discriminatory practices within institutions which may
contribute to employee acts of sexual assault. On application of
224 B.(P.A.), supra note 14 at
22 5 On the principle of the

35.
non-delegable duty, see supra note 22. Also see the
recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Lewis (Guardian ad item of) v. British
Columbia (1997) S.C.]. No. 109 (11Dec.1997), which is based upon a finding of a
non-delegable duty arising from statutory authority. That case involved an analysis
of the relationship between the Crown and independent contractors in the context
of highways maintenance. While the concept of the non-delegable duty is generally
applied as an alternative to vicarious liability where the relevant tortfeasor is not as
such an employee, still the concept might apply, as Newbury JA. suggests, to
establish direct liability of the Crown or a children's aid society invested with a
statutory duty to care for and protect the children in relation to whom in loco
parentis authority is assumed.
226 "Vicarious Liability for Sexual Assault" (Paper prepared for the 12th
Biennial N.A.W.L. Conference, Access to Justice for Women: The Changing Face
ofinequality, Oct. 30-Nov. 2, 1997) [unpublished].
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such an analysis, organizations found to place children, women, or
any groups or individuals in jeopardy of sexual abuse or assault
might then be more likely to be held accountable, and as such
overtly at fault, for employee acts of sexual assault. Yet those
organizations which have implemented policies and practices which
contribute to equitable and respectful relationships between the
sexes, for instance, or a nurturing, safe environment for children,
may be less likely to be found liable for an employee's sexual
misconduct.
It is unfortunate that B. (P.A.) and Griffiths, as cases addressing
employer liability for sexual assault only under the heading of
vicarious liability, do not present for the Supreme Court's
consideration the full range of arguments concerning alternative
headings of employer liability. Still, some response may be raised
here to the feminist-inspired call for a more scrupulous contextbased approach to direct employer liability in such cases, as an
alternative to analysis of vicarious liability. In this regard, it is
noteworthy that while neither Huddart J.A. nor any other member
of the B.C. Court of Appeal invoked feminist principles overtly in
B. (P.A.), the sustained emphasis in both her and Newbury ].A.' s
judgments upon contextual analysis and analysis of power relations
contributing to the likelihood of sexual assault may be seen to
correspond in many respects with a feminist analysis.
In broadest terms, sexual assault may be understood as enabled
by a whole complex of relationships of power and vulnerability
conferred upon men, women, and children in a patriarchal society.
Yet in B. (P.A.) and Griffiths, the judiciary has sought to identify
within that broad power structure particular instances of assumption
and conferral of power which may occasion legal liability for
another's act of sexual assault. As such, liability may attach to an
employer through analysis not of the general social constructedness
of the perpetrator's
role,
but the employment-related
constructedness of that role. Under this analysis, it must be
established that liability rightly lies in the particular corporate or
institutional entity under which the relevant employee's duties and
authority have been assigned, insofar as those duties and authority,
viewed within the context of the enterprise as a whole, significantly
enabled the employee to commit the sexual assault, or significantly
increased the probability of the assault's occurring.
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The issue which commentators such as Kristjanson raise is
whether the aims of a feminist analysis, or more particularly, an
analysis of power and its abuses in the form of sexual assault, might
be better served by focusing upon employer duty and fault, and so
not sweeping into the same category of liability organizations
fostering relationships of inequality or neglecting safety and those
dedicated to helping the vulnerable and making practical efforts at
instituting an ethic of equality and care. Yet the point of Huddart
].A., in her emphasis upon commutative rather than corrective or
distributive justice, is that regardless of bona fide preventive or
ameliorative measures, those enterprises or institutions which
impose (and, under this analysis, thereby benefit from) certain
power relationships-or privileges, as argued here with regard to
special powers of access-must accept responsibility for
compensating those who are harmed by abuses of the power or
privilege assumed and conferred. Institutions directed at helping
the vulnerable constitute no exception. It may be that the move
from a corrective justice orientation to fault (applying between
individuals) to a commutative justice orientation to alignment of
benefits and harms (applying between a corporate body and an
individual)-and then under the second model, the interpretation
of an organization's assumption of powers to assist the vulnerable as
its receiving a benefit-may seem counterintuitive. But the core of
the argument and its justificatory basis must be kept in mind: that
is, the notion of the interrelatedness of the assumption and
conferral of power on the part of a corporate body or institution,
and that organizations' s responsibility for compensation when
individuals are harmed through the abuse of such power.
It is now for the Supreme Court of Canada to determine
whether or to what extent the doctrine of vicarious liabililty may be
applied with some degree of context-sensitivity in the assessment of
employer liability for employee acts of sexual assault. The response
of that Court to the B.C. Court of Appeal's new tests for scope of
employment will dearly have important implications for
employers-most particularly government and non-government
organizations serving vulnerable populations. And it will have
important implications for those claimants seeking to extend
liability for sexual assault to those employers or enterprises they
regard as in part responsible for the wrongs done them. Perhaps, as
some suggest, justice would be better served in an analysis of the
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duty and direct fault of the employer or institution at issue. Yet the
B.C. Court of Appeal in its analysis of vicarious liability has
nonetheless raised an important and compelling set of arguments
regarding where responsibility may be found to lie for
compensation following abuses of employee power in the form of
sexual assault. Ultimately, the point of Huddart J.A. is a strong
one: When such abuses occur within relationships of power that are
mandated in order to serve the public good or to serve the interests
of society's most vulnerable, all members of the community bear
some responsibility to ensure the compensation of the victim.

